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Abstract  This chapter examines the roles played by respiration—as 
physiological process, and embodied response—in the development 
of aesthetic theories at the end of the nineteenth century, traced from 
Ruskin to Vernon Lee. Late nineteenth-century attempts to define aes-
thetic experience in terms of its attendant physiological reactions still 
drew on breath’s immaterial poetic associations (air, wind and spirit) 
while being alert to the way respiratory control shifts easily between vol-
untary and involuntary modes of experience (will/automation). Lee’s 
idea of aesthetic experience envisages a complex, perhaps mystifying, 
action of involvement with works of art, dependent upon physiological, 
sensorimotor and respiratory movement. Exploring her understanding of 
empathetic identification, and relating it to current models of enactive 
cognition, the chapter recovers an entangled art and science of breath in 
nineteenth-century aesthetic theory.
Keywords  Breath · Aesthetics · Affect · Physiology · Psychology · 
Empathy · Enactivism
CHAPTER 4
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Let me begin with three markings of breath:
Abundant images no more make a poem than any number of swallows 
make a summer. … True poetry is as real, as needful, and naturally as com-
mon to every man as the blood of his heart and the breath of his nostrils.
(E. S. Dallas, Poetics: An Essay on Poetry, 1852)1
The sea-beach round this isle of ours is the frieze of our Parthenon, every 
wave that breaks on it thunders with Athena’s voice; nay, whenever you 
throw your window wide open in the morning, you let in Athena, as wis-
dom and fresh air at the same instant; and whenever you draw a pure, 
long, full breath of right heaven, you take Athena into your heart, through 
your blood; and with the blood, into the thoughts of your brain.
(John Ruskin, The Queen of the Air, 1869)2
If experience consists of impressions, it may be said that impressions are 
experience, just as (have we not seen it?) they are the very air we breathe.
(Henry James, “The Art of Fiction,” 1884)3
Breath, usually so hard to see or notice, receives here three different 
encodings in the language of nineteenth-century aesthetics, each one 
disclosing an intimacy between art and the action of breathing that sur-
passes the purely figurative.4 In the first, by the scientific literary critic 
E. S. Dallas, whose mid-century Poetics channelled the deductive reason-
ing of Aristotle and Bacon, and also in the third, by Henry James, respi-
ration is used as a sign of naturalness that establishes the imbrication of 
art in life. In the Dallas and James passages, poetry and aesthetic experi-
ence (under the rubric of the “impression”) emerge not merely as ana-
logues of physiological vitality but as modes of its extension or unfolding. 
Art, in the broadest sense, aligns with the lived world, partaking of and 
flourishing within its atmosphere (atmosphere being another pointedly 
Jamesian term in “The Art of Fiction”).5 If both wish, in different ways, 
to naturalise the domain of aesthetics by aligning it with organic rhythms 
of reciprocation, of which breathing is an exemplary case, then this is 
organised into two distinct emphases. One of these falls on the signif-
icance of nonconscious or reflex action. Notice how insistently Dallas, 
for one, subordinates poetic image to poetic form, for what embeds 
“true poetry” in the lived or natural order is not its power of semantic 
 reference—not imagery or theme or other devices of denotation—but 
the fact of its rhythm and continuity, its way of pushing on, in sympathy 
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with the persistence of breath. A second emphasis, also on living process, 
 connects breath with consciousness by asserting that impressions (of art 
and of life) are a kind of oxygenation (James). But in the Ruskin passage, 
contrastingly, one finds no such naturalisation. Beguilingly, in The Queen 
of the Air, more or less the reverse holds: Ruskin locates Greek myth 
in the circulating air, and in the body’s essential strivings and chemical 
transformations, as though the goddess Athena might literally be assim-
ilated by the tissues. Ordinary breath, usually beneath awareness, now 
feels ontologically lithe, a shaping force composed of air, myth and mat-
ter, connecting the lungs with a vast transpersonal system of circulation 
and meaning. Ruskin’s breath, then, is exultantly defamiliarised, convert-
ing an invisible substance into an aesthetically visible and vital one.
In this chapter, I want to trace the development of these subtle 
 tensions and topoi, as a way of understanding breath and breathing in 
the progressively materialist aesthetics of the late nineteenth century. 
Styling this as “respiratory aesthetics” is more than a convenience, 
I hope, and intends to bring into focus the special importance of breath 
to debates over the province of art, and art’s genesis, form and force, 
as the late-Victorian moment shades into early modernist culture, par-
ticularly in the critical thought of Vernon Lee (Violet Paget). The ques-
tions I seek to address through Lee—of how and why certain ideas of 
breath and breathing come to bear upon theories of aesthetic form by 
the end of the nineteenth century, of how breath matters to the expe-
rience of art—relate to a larger field of enquiry, loosely identified as 
Victorian scientific aesthetics, which has already been influentially 
mapped by Nicholas Dames and, recently, Benjamin Morgan.6 Shifting 
down an analytical level, such questions also contain narrower subsets, 
including how understandings of the physiology of respiration influenced 
nineteenth-century prosody, a topic explored lucidly by Jason Rudy and 
Jason Hall.7 If neither the higher nor the lower level is the target of my 
argument, what I hope to recover through Vernon Lee and other theo-
reticians, from Ruskin and Dallas onwards, has much in common with 
these critics’ interest in a Victorian turn to physiological systems for an 
explanation of art’s embodied life.
As a writer and intellectual who straddled literary periods and cut 
across the diverging “two cultures” of art and science, Lee helps to illu-
minate particular ways in which breathing gathered meanings within 
British aesthetic tradition in the era roughly between the highpoint of 
Ruskin’s influence and the 1920s. Prolific as a novelist, critic, essayist, 
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art historian and author of supernatural stories, as well as an aesthetician, 
she had a close association with Walter Pater and aestheticism, embraced 
decadence and impressionism, subsequently absorbed Nietzsche’s phi-
losophy of tragedy, and in politics held committedly socialist, pacifist 
and feminist views.8 At the same time, she drew on, extended and chal-
lenged the scientific naturalism of Darwin and mid-Victorian psychol-
ogy (Alexander Bain, Herbert Spencer), while engaging closely with 
contemporary German thought, notably the psychology of Theodore 
Lipps, leading Lee to apply empirical and statistical methods to the 
study of art.9 In other words, various influences flow into, and through, 
her critical prose and mingle in its expository textures. Those empha-
ses that organise the breathy passages above—on reflex action (Dallas), 
vitality/flow (Ruskin) and embodied thought (James)—can all be dis-
covered in Lee’s writings on visual art, music, and language and litera-
ture. Recovering breath’s substance and freight in these works may seem 
to confirm Lee’s intellectual singularity, as I say, but it has the further 
advantage of making visible a wider history of respiratory aesthetics that 
belongs to late-Victorian modernity.
Art unthought
In “Ruskinism” (1881), her forthright early work of intellectual self-po-
sitioning, Vernon Lee magnificently dismantles Ruskin’s preachy excesses 
on the morality of art. Everywhere, she complains, Ruskin equates the 
good with the beautiful—a fundamental, erroneous conflation, ripe for 
renunciation—because of a residual puritanism in Ruskin that cannot 
admit aesthetic pleasure on its own terms and must instead annex it to 
some higher purpose. Ruskin’s whole ethics of criticism comes down to 
this point: the sensuous wellsprings of beauty remain troublingly divert-
ing, and in need of moral and spiritual rescue, such that sinful grati-
fication must be converted into noblest virtue. “Ruskin has loved art 
instinctively, fervently, for its own sake,” Lee points out, admiringly, “but 
he has constantly feared lest this love should be sinful or at least base.”10  
In consequence, he “must tranquillize his conscience about art; he must 
persuade himself that he is justified in employing his thoughts about it; 
and lest it be a snare of the demon, he must make it a service of God.”11 
At root, as revealed in his most characteristic moments, Ruskin “made 
the enjoyment of mere beauty a base pleasure, requiring a moral object 
to purify it, and in so doing he has destroyed its own purifying power.”12 
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As “Ruskinism” ends, with Lee now eased into the aesthete’s role, the 
essay yields an affirmation of startling dexterity, in its own way a kind of 
inverted Ruskinism, which celebrates pleasure’s intrinsic virtue: “For, 
though art has no moral meaning, it has a moral value; art is happiness, 
and to bestow happiness is to create good.”13 This is hedonist aesthetics 
housed in the stately precincts of Victorian high seriousness.
What emerges from Lee’s effort to displace Ruskin—and what matters 
from the perspective of breath—is an accompanying return to less con-
ceptual and more instinctual modes of relational awareness anchored in 
the body. When Lee announces in her introduction to Belcaro (1881), 
the book in which “Ruskinism” appeared, that her purpose in discuss-
ing art will be to re-engage a mood of childish enjoyment, she describes 
turning her back decisively on once cherished texts of high aesthetic 
theory—her well-thumbed and carefully annotated Plato and Hegel, 
her Ruskin and Taine—in order to establish the possibility of a direct 
encounter with works of art. Such a gesture of uncluttering (“getting 
rid of those foreign, extra-artistic, irrelevant interests which aestheticians 
have since the beginning of time interposed between art and those who 
are intended to enjoy it”) clears a path for what will become her distinc-
tive approach to understanding objects displayed in galleries, music and 
poetry, even when less overtly sympathetic to the ideas of the Aesthetic 
Movement.14 In Belcaro, she recalls discovering the poverty of theory as 
a primal recognition:
Much as I read, copied, annotated, analysed, imitated [these authorities],  
I could not really take in any of the things which I read …. As soon as I got 
back in the presence of art itself, all my carefully acquired artistic philoso-
phy, mystic, romantic, or transcendental, was forgotten: I looked at pictures 
and statues, and saw in them mere lines and colours, pleasant or unpleasant; 
I listened to music, and … I discovered that, during the period of listening, 
my mind had been a complete blank, and that all I could possibly recol-
lect were notes. My old original prosaic, matter-of-fact feeling about art, as 
something simple, straightforward, enjoyable, always persisted beneath all 
the metaphysics and all the lyrism with which I tried to crush it.15
Rediscovering the “presence” of art is, in one sense, an abiding pur-
pose in each of Belcaro’s layered, meandering essays, and the term sur-
faces insistently here amidst a crystalline memory of responding to some 
artistic patterns and forms (“mere” lines and colours, pure sequences 
of musical notes) with a felt sense of involvement, yet little, if any, 
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accompanying representational awareness. Music, in the moment, was a 
“blank”; pictures and sculptures were enjoyable purely as objects com-
prised of structured visual elements.
Art’s real mode of presence, this suggests, comes before its emergence 
as an object of knowledge. Preceding categories of knowledge and judg-
ment, its presence is both pre-ethical and grounded on an impressionable 
yet preconscious body, the body of its percipient subject. As this begins 
to indicate, art’s way of being present can be framed in terms of action, 
a point emphasised throughout Lee’s writing on aesthetics, right up to 
her last published work, Music and Its Lovers (1932), where she describes 
the artwork as a “junction between the activities of the artist and those 
of the beholder or hearer.”16 Far from signalling the contemplation of an 
ineffable object whose nature remains wordlessly withdrawn, or pointing 
towards modernism’s austere poetics of impersonality, presence (under-
stood as action) registers something like a feat of coordination, perhaps 
better parsed as co-presence or interaction—that is to say, the embod-
ied co-presence of, on the one hand, a beholder, listener or reader and, 
on the other, a canvas, sonata or poem (say), extended together in time. 
Put like this, aesthetic experience has discernable features: the quality of 
duration, the structure of dynamic coupling or interaction, and it consti-
tutes a form of doing.
In outline, Lee’s quarrel with Ruskinism was roughly of a piece with 
Walter Pater’s inwardly focused “first step” of aesthetic criticism: the 
creed of knowing one’s own impressions rather than seeking to know 
the art object in itself.17 In common with post-Paterian British literary 
decadence, Lee accorded special importance to the notion of impres-
sionability. The mind of the critic, now exemplary, was defined by how 
appropriately susceptible it could prove itself. What power does an art-
work have to affect me? How does it elicit my impressions of beauty or 
pleasure? By making fleeting personal impressions the decisive locus of 
value, instead of treating high art as the intrinsic material instantiation 
of abstract ideals, as the moralists Ruskin and Arnold had done, late- 
Victorian critics channelled the “relative spirit” of the final quarter of 
the century.18 As Daniel Hannah puts it, “[t]he Paterian impression and 
Wilde’s and [Henry] James’s adaptations of it shift the focus of aesthetic 
analysis from the text as embodied meaning to the critic as ecstatic art-
ist.”19 The same went for Lee, in general terms. But, at a more exacting 
level of scrutiny, it is clear that she diverged from Paterian subjectivism, 
in key respects. If the subject of impressionism risked being marooned in 
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a swirl of fleeting, wispy appearances (i.e. to say, in the realm of  mental 
representation), as Pater had hinted at in his infamous “Conclusion” 
to Studies in the History of the Renaissance,20 then Lee’s interest after 
Belcaro was increasingly taken up with the role of the responsive body 
in aesthetic cognition, including sensorimotor movements, reflex actions 
and the bodily unconscious.21 One focus of her later empirical investi-
gations was the background arousal, the affective to-and-fro, of breath-
ing, as I discuss later on. Pre-conceptual knowing would underpin her 
view of how people succeed in being immersively involved with cultural 
objects in their proximate environment—an empathy with things seen 
or heard, by means of a process I am characterising as active coupling—
without arriving at the brink of solipsism and disengagement.22
Even if Pater’s psychology implicitly recognised the “corporeal medi-
ation of thought,” as Benjamin Morgan has suggested, a consequential 
feature of Vernon Lee’s way of thinking about impressionability was 
its strongly physical—its physiological, its neuromuscular—character23 
Physiological impressions did not necessarily rise to introspective con-
sciousness; she considered them part of cognitive activity, in the sense 
of being an unthought component of attentive perception, even if they 
bypassed explicit representational encoding in the mind. Automatic and 
reflex actions—of the sort exemplified by breathing—thereby came into 
the orbit of her aesthetic theory. Such an overlap can be found in other 
critics and writers of the late-Victorian era. We have already seen how 
Henry James could think of impressions as inhalations—continuous, 
instinctive, commonplace, like the very air we breathe. Edith Wharton, 
in 1903, would passingly declare (in a fascinatingly prickly essay about 
the state of the novel and novel-readers) that “real reading is reflex 
action; the born reader reads as unconsciously as he breathes.”24 As with 
James’s decidedly exclusive appeal to a “we” who inhales impressions of 
life, Wharton’s recourse to respiratory language conveys the opposite 
of something ordinary or democratic: an aristocratic sense of literacy as 
effortless, inborn, and inevitable, in contrast to the self-improving exer-
tion of newly educated readers from the expanding middle classes, for 
whom books were all about consciously invested labour and deferred 
reward.
Talk of unconscious processes reached back further into the nineteenth 
century, however. The importance of instinctive actions to mind and body, 
especially perception, had been established by mid-Victorian psychology 
and then annexed by peripheral debates in aesthetics and scientific literary 
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criticism, which helps explain why the phrase “reflex action” came so read-
ily to Wharton’s lips. Wharton, as one can hear, took it to mean something 
organic and vital, and not a name for compulsive mechanical twitchings 
of the flesh and muscle. If reading was reflex action, it was so because 
reflexes had now acceded to cognitive office. The new physiological psy-
chology of the 1850s and 60s, in pioneering this view, had rewritten earlier 
mechanistic understandings of the physiological body, showing how reflex 
actions and unconscious processes were tied to the thought and agency of 
the person as a unified living organism. In fact, Darwin’s “bulldog,” T. H. 
Huxley, used nothing other than the act of reading to explain the princi-
ple of reflex action in his incredibly popular Lessons of Elementary Physiology 
(1866), alongside the example of a soldier perfecting military drill exer-
cises at an officer’s command (that being a learnt or “artificial” reflex, 
showing how all education might involve, at root, “organizing conscious 
actions into more or less unconscious, or reflex, operations”).25 When 
we read a book, Huxley observed, we hold it automatically at an optimal 
distance from our eyes, adjust our posture suitably and make countless 
“delicate” movements with our hands and eyes as we read, mostly with-
out noticing that we are doing any of this.26 A similar theory was intended 
by the physiologist W. B. Carpenter when, in 1854, he coined the influ-
ential phrase “unconscious cerebration,” a term which can be parsed as 
thinking without thinking, as Vanessa Ryan has styled it.27 For the critic 
E. S. Dallas, unconscious thought and actions were evidence of a “hid-
den reason” operating outside our awareness, “a power that with the 
greatest ease reaches spontaneously to results beyond reckoning, beyond 
understanding.”28
Respiration was, of course, both exemplary and a special category here. If 
breathing offered a powerful instance of automatic reflex action—as Dallas 
put it, “the brain keeps guard over the various processes of the body—as 
the beating of the heart and the breathing of the lungs”—then it had the 
further characteristic of being able to flit between involuntary regulation 
and temporary volitional control.29 In this respect, argued George Henry 
Lewes, the influential man of science and Victorian polymath, respiration 
had something in common with phenomena like winking and laughter, 
which in some situations cannot be prevented from occurring, however 
hard we actively resist, while at other times they obey the influence of the 
conscious will (as in winking to signal ironic intent, or laughing politely at 
an unfunny remark). A sneeze, which cannot be willed, would be an exam-
ple of a purely involuntary action. Breathing, then, dramatised for Lewes 
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the limits and nature of our embodied agency: “Although breathing is an 
involuntary act, it can be, and often is, restrained or accelerated by the will; 
but the controlling power soon come to an end—we cannot voluntarily sus-
pend our breathing for many seconds; the urgency of the sensation at last 
bears down the control.”30 In other important ways, breathing was a deep 
puzzle. Why we breathe, as opposed to how we do so, remained unclear 
to science, Lewes noted. It was, patently, a matter of life and death. But 
why does insufficient fresh air cause death in an organism when the blood 
in its arteries still holds oxygen? Why does a newborn baby sometimes 
require external help from a doctor or nurse, who slaps them on the back, 
to begin to breathe?31 “By what influence,” asked the Scottish psychologist 
Alexander Bain, similarly, “do we draw our first breath?”32 These were more 
than narrow physical enquiries to be filled out by a more detailed story of 
ontogeny; they concerned the will of our creaturely being and the scope of 
subjectivity.
They had a bearing upon aesthetic questions, too. The same hid-
den power that keeps the lungs expanding and contracting, day and 
night, and controls a host of other unnoticed vital functions, was doing 
the work of a “musical conductor,” Dallas said.33 This was a revealing 
choice of image, for Dallas was convinced that prized artistic accomplish-
ments, such as the delicate control of a painter’s brush or the compass 
of a soprano’s voice, were made possible by the same sort of automa-
ticity that governed breath. Conversely, the imagination was ruled only 
by “the sort of control which we can bring to bear on the essentially 
involuntary act of breathing.”34 In The Gay Science (1866), he marvels at 
the German opera singer Gertrud Mara, who had been celebrated for her 
unusual vocal range:
[A]ll the 1500 varieties of musical sounds which Madame Mara could pro-
duce came from degrees in the tension of her [throat] muscles which are 
to be represented by dividing the eighth part of an inch into 1500 sub-
divisions. Which of us by taking thought can follow such arithmetic? No 
singer can consciously divide the tension of her vocal chords into 12,000 
parts of an inch, and select one of these; nevertheless she may hit with 
infallible accuracy the precise note which depends upon this minute subdi-
vision of muscular energy.35
Mara’s artistic skill in calculating exact note intervals during an aria did 
not depend on explicit mental coordination, just the spontaneity of her 
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musically trained body: a remarkable, beautiful, feat of implicit practical 
intelligence.
One could call it art without thinking. This was certainly Dallas’s 
view, based on the evident conjunction of instinct and imagination, 
as a secret agency. Indeed, The Gay Science categorises some uncon-
scious reflex actions under the term “imagination.” Aesthetic and crea-
tive feelings could be fully volitional without bearing conscious effort: 
“The artist can trust to his hand, to his throat, to his eye, to render 
with unfailing accuracy subtle distinctions of tone and shades of mean-
ing with which reason can have nothing to do – with which no effort 
of reason can keep pace.”36 In other words, hands or voices  accomplish 
artistic work themselves, directly, in real time, without the mediating 
theatre of conscious decision-making and internal representation, just 
fluent sensorimotor movement. Put this way, the hypothesis invites par-
allels with recent enactivist cognitive science, as I shall suggest in the 
last section below. But a figure who Dallas invoked to corroborate his 
version of unconscious cerebration was none other than Ruskin: it was 
Ruskin, he points out, who wrote so eloquently of the “subtle instinct” 
of Turner’s hand and its superiority over the eye when  detailing 
very fine shades of light.37 It was Ruskin who knew about embodied 
cognition.
drAwn-in breAth And wide-oPened eyes
While distancing herself from Ruskinism and the rhetoric of mid- 
Victorian criticism, Vernon Lee absorbed the influence of both. Her own 
respiratory aesthetics extended the then new reflex theory circulating 
among the likes of Lewes, Bain, Carpenter, Dallas and others, angling it 
towards a theory of art as experience. Ruskin himself had spoken of how 
great painters “do their best work without effort,” by applying subtle 
layers of colour to a canvas in an “apparently careless” or “unconscious” 
fashion, yet with near-mathematical precision.38 He included this note in 
an appendix to The Two Paths (1859), the same book in which he pub-
lished “The Work of Iron, In Nature, Art and Policy,” a sinuous disquisi-
tion containing a startling passage on breath:
[W]e suppose it to be a great defect in iron that it is subject to rust. But 
not at all. … Nay, in a certain sense, and almost a literal one, we may say 
that iron rusted is Living; but when pure or polished, Dead. … It takes 
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the oxygen from the atmosphere as eagerly as we do, though it uses it dif-
ferently. The iron keeps all that it gets; we, and other animals, part with 
it again; but the metal absolutely keeps what it has once received of this 
aerial gift …. [A]ll the substance of which it is made sucks and breathes the 
brilliancy of the atmosphere; and, as it breathes, softening from its merci-
less hardness, it falls into fruitful and beneficent dust; gathering itself again 
into the earths from which we feed, and the stones with which we build; – 
into the rocks that frame the mountains, and the sands that bind the sea.39
Originally a lecture performed to the people of Tunbridge Wells in 1858, 
“The Work of Iron” still quavers with the affects of live address. Here, 
its confounding seriousness is part of a tactic of challenging conventional 
formations of value: aesthetic, economic and environmental. But under-
neath its outwardly bizarre moralism, which insists on the nobility of rust 
and the beauty of decay, Ruskin unfolds a vision of distributed material 
vitality built around the wondrous ubiquity of oxygenation. Ironwork 
“breathes” and corrodes, its “dust” replenishing the earth and literally 
colouring the landscape (the streaks of colour in a pebble, the “violet 
veinings” of Sicilian marble, the purple warmth of Welsh slate), and also 
flowing into the human body and lending the blood its crimson: “Is it 
not strange to find this stern and strong metal mingled so delicately in 
our human life that we cannot even blush without its help?”40 All of this 
derives from the world’s unconscious breathwork.
In a still wholly humanist way, breath unites us with the  non-human, 
for Ruskin: the living air affords connection, interaction,  inter-existence, 
an idea later emblemised by Athena in The Queen of the Air (1869). 
Whatever else he means by it, breath becomes a basis for feelings of iden-
tification with the contingent life of things, and in this sense, it exer-
cises an aesthetic potential. Grasping why intricate vermillion streaks of 
iron oxide running through a stone are somehow distantly connected 
to our living bodies—to the physiological energy that beats its rhythm 
in our veins and lungs—is a very particular kind of aesthetic knowing. 
It entails an apprehension of form as living and relational, grounded 
on an affective body. Now, Ruskin, always at once a paradoxically cen-
tral and eccentric figure in Victorian intellectual culture, did not share 
obvious affinities with the likes of Bain, Carpenter or Dallas, who were 
among the leading the scientific lights here (though Dallas remained 
an admirer his Modern Painters).41 He would, in fact, on occasion, 
parody those who aspired to explain art or beauty scientifically.42  
But one way of thinking about Ruskin’s living air is to compare it, albeit 
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counter-intuitively, with the concept of aesthetic empathy that emerged 
in the decadent twilight of Victorian modernity, chiefly through the col-
laborative investigations of Lee and her lover Clementina Anstruther-
Thomson, who took their bearings from earlier materialist aesthetics and 
versions of unconscious cerebration as much as from Paterian idealism.
Empathy (Einfühlung) was not a word Ruskin used or knew, of 
course. Nonetheless, its sense of “feeling-into,” as Vernon Lee would 
come to think of it, after the German philosopher Robert Vischer, cap-
tures something of Ruskin’s sense of the vital attunement of subject 
and object that he identified with the flow of breathable air. One might 
notice it, too, in his example of the graceful prospect of a songbird in 
flight, in The Queen of the Air, where the bird “rests upon the air, sub-
dues it, surpasses it, outraces it; – is the air, conscious of itself, conquer-
ing itself, ruling itself,” and where “into the throat of the bird is given 
the voice of the air”—a resplendent synchrony.43 Bird and air are ide-
ally attuned, smoothly reciprocating, almost coalescent forces. Empathy, 
or in-feeling, if more specific, was an explanation of attunement. Lee 
imported the term in her book The Beautiful (1913), where she began 
by stating that it was a “tendency to merge the activities of the perceiv-
ing subject with the qualities of the perceived object.”44 Affective invest-
ment, as John Frow points out, had been intrinsic to theories of fictional 
character long before empathy’s ostensible birth, and not simply in the 
form of obvious readerly “identification” in such narrative genres as the 
Bildungsroman.45 Lee, too, thought the “apparent recent discovery” of 
empathy was only the uncanny recognition of something deeply famil-
iar.46 What she did not mean by it, however, was the sense of feeling one-
self into things, the romantic-idealist identification of the self with the 
other through conscious egoic projection. Empathetic “mergings,” as 
opposed to projection, required the “momentary abeyance of all thought 
of an ego,” a lapsing of self-awareness.47 In this respect, empathy rekin-
dled Ruskin’s denunciation of the pathetic fallacy.48
When, for instance, we use a commonplace expression like the moun-
tain rises to describe the outline shape of a landscape, we do not con-
sciously anthropomorphise the inanimate mountain, transferring to 
it a present subjective experience of rising. Nor (usually) do we mean 
“rising” to refer to the massive upward geological pressure that origi-
nally caused the mountain to form. The action of rising, if not strictly 
an objective property of its shape, is also more than just a thought 
prompted in us by the mountain: it is rising per se, a generalised 
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conception of what it is to rise (the infinitive form of the verb, uncon-
strained by a particular tense or pronoun). Innumerable memories of 
lifting and raising—in ourselves (of our eyes and head, of our separate 
muscles and limbs and of our whole body) and experiences of it in other 
bodies—have fused with anticipations of such movements in the future, 
to form this infinitive conceptualisation of the action of rising, now 
separate from ourselves and the immediate unfurling of our subjective 
agency. Thus, the rising mountain (or the slope that goes up, or the line 
that drops down) involves the unconscious transfer of feelings of motion, 
loosed from a subject, into a quality of the static object. These examples 
cannot be dismissed as figures of speech or staled metaphors. For Lee, 
empathy (Einfühlung) was precisely what made figures of speech possi-
ble, a psychological mechanism underpinning meaning itself. Decades 
before George Lakoff and Mark Johnson identified the “metaphors we 
live by,” she saw that empathetic identification grounded what the field 
of cognitive linguistics now calls embodied conceptual metaphor and, 
as such, it was present throughout mental life, “traced in all modes of 
speech and thought.”49 It was, though, especially powerful for explain-
ing aesthetic pattern and form.
Breathing—a mostly unconscious cycle of diaphragmatic contraction 
and relaxation—as I enter a cathedral, stand before a landscape painting 
or statue, read a lyric poem or savour a cantata, plays a decisive part in 
the integrated suite of background responses that allow me to recognise 
the force of these definite aesthetic forms. For Lee, the energy of—or 
the energy seemingly “in”—certain patterns, shapes, lines, words, sounds 
and rhythms has its origins in my own responsive living breath and 
breathing body. The mere sight of the word beautiful, quite apart from 
any object of beauty, will often cause affective arousal within the respira-
tory cycle, in virtue of it “carrying a vague but potent remembrance of 
our own bodily reaction to the emotion of admiration; nay, even elic-
iting an incipient rehearsal of the half-parted lips and slightly thrown-
back head, the drawn-in breath and wide-opened eyes, with which we 
are wont to meet opportunities of aesthetic satisfaction.”50 This reveals 
two features of empathetic identification, as Lee thinks about it. First, 
empathising does not ask of art “What is it?”, having nothing strictly 
to do with identifications inside the representational plane of works of 
art, such as a novel’s narrative storyworld and its represented agents and 
viewpoints, or the treatment of a theme by a painter or sculptor (feel-
ing moved to pity, say, by a scene of human suffering), or the imitative 
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properties of a heard melody. Only aspects of formal structure matter: 
in Lee’s terminology, shape precedes things. At this level, empathy might 
appear peculiarly indifferent to the human context of emotional expres-
sion, and consequently easy to regard as a reaction against Victorian 
sentimentalism. Yet it was Ruskin rather than proponents of evolution-
ary science (Herbert Spencer, Grant Allen) who, for Lee, had greater 
authority in making a link between the emergence of aesthetic preference 
(beauty and ugliness) and primary bodily affects (distinguishing pleasure 
from pain).51
A second feature of note in Lee’s mention of an “incipient rehearsal 
of … the drawn-in breath and wide-opened eyes” is that the empa-
thetic imagination has a temporal structure of its own and tends towards 
revival and repetition, which Lee labels empathy’s “reiterative nature.”52 
Past affects remain stored in the body and contribute to habituation. 
Experiencing aesthetic empathy involves, at the level of the lived body, 
looping effects of experience, context, habituation, learning and accul-
turation. A tourist with limited cultural background knowledge will not 
respond to art objects with automatic aesthetic empathy, even before 
celebrated paintings or hallowed architecture.53 This point, not with-
out a whiff of snobbery, shows Lee resisting what she perceived to be 
a troubling fin de siècle tendency of translating l’art pour l’art into the 
commodification of pleasure. It also shows her resisting theories of bio-
logical essentialism: evolution has not made certain forms inherently 
pleasing; the mind has not been adaptively furnished with innate powers 
of aesthetic recognition. Instead, as a process of attunement with objects, 
empathy needs a personal history of embodied practice.
For these reasons, Lee’s collaboration with Anstruther-Thomson 
in the 1880s and 90s, which led to the publication of their 1897 essay 
“Beauty and Ugliness” (1897), reads like a study of Clementina’s vis-
ceral, muscular and respiratory life—a jointly authored memoir of the 
body—focusing on her experience of works of art. When reprinting 
“Beauty and Ugliness” in 1912, Lee announced that her evolving view 
of empathy was the “offspring” of its central theory.54 Their original 
method of investigation, using art galleries as experimental spaces, may 
have appeared “kooky” and even mockable but it was taken seriously by 
continental psychologists and philosophers, such as Théodule Ribot and 
Theodor Lipps, as Caroline Burdett has shown.55 With its almost dia-
logic structure, a to-and-fro of passages of each woman’s writing coded 
by initials and typographical marks, “Beauty and Ugliness” manages to 
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convey a kind of respiratory rhythm in its textual procedures while also 
fixating directly—forensically—on Clementina’s breathing:
[T]he movements of the eyes seem to have been followed by the breath. 
The bilateralness of the object seems to have put both lungs into play. 
There has been a feeling of the two sides of the chest making a sort of 
pull apart; the breath has begun low down and raised on both sides of the 
chest; a slight contraction of the chest seems to accompany the eyes as they 
move along the top of the chair till they got to the middle; then, when the 
eyes ceased focusing the chair, the breath was exhaled.56
One might call this physiological introspection, making the breath vis-
ible, during the process of perceiving a simple chair. These words of 
Anstruther-Thomson capture her, quite typically, straining to access 
knowledge of her own involuntary responses and actions, at the out-
ermost edges of conscious life. This is not perceptual knowledge of an 
intellectual or representational kind, even if bodily mimicry may result 
from aesthetic empathy (e.g. unconsciously imitating the facial expres-
sion carved in a marble bust). Rather, qualities such as the chair’s height, 
width and bulk originate in the described adjustments in the breathing 
apparatus and other fine motor movements. As Lee explains, “breath-
ing and balance are the actual physical mechanism for the reception of 
Form, the sense of relation having for its counterpart a sense of bodily 
tension.”57 Our eyes and breath trace together the sweep of a rounded 
arch, its downward movement embodied in the unnoticed, or barely 
felt, exhalation of the lungs; a forward and backward motion of breath, 
achieved by involuntary adjustments of the thorax and diaphragm, and 
ordinarily present when we walk, helps with the realisation of three- 
dimensional depth and distance in landscape painting.58
Colour appreciation, the authors deduce, has a special relation to 
breath:
[W]e seem to inhale colour. For, while stimulating the eye, we find that colour 
also stimulates the nostrils and the top of the throat; for a colour sensation on 
the eye is followed quite involuntarily by a strong movement of inspiration, 
producing thereby a rush of cold air through the nostrils on to the tongue 
and the top of the throat, and this rush of cold air has a singularly stimulating 
effect: sometimes the sight of an extremely vivid colour like that of tropical 
birds, or of vivid local colour strung up by brilliant sunshine, has a curious 
effect on the top of the throat, amounting to an impulse to give out a voice.59
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Inviting their reader to experiment in various ways (holding their 
breath, briefly closing an eye, taking a deep lungful of air and so on), 
Lee and Anstruther-Thomson persist with empirical proofs of the view 
that “aesthetic pleasure in art is due to the production of highly vital-
ising, and therefore agreeable, adjustments of breathing and balance as 
factors of the perception of form.”60 Respiratory empathy underlies, for 
instance, the quality of “coolness” in Vincenzo Catena’s Saint Jerome 
in his Study (1510), a painting whose colour, “by stimulating certain of 
our nerves connected with breathing, gives to the air which we inhale 
a sort of exhilarating power”; in Lee’s own gallery notes, from 1904, 
on Raphael’s frescoes in the Sistine Chapel, she reflects that “I certainly 
seem to see better breathing through nostrils than through mouth. The 
open mouth is inattention. More and more I suspect all this breathing 
business is a question of attention.”61 This last remark is especially sug-
gestive: not only does it say that aesthetic form emerges out of breath, 
as it were, but it hints that art affords attentional interest by means of an 
active coupling with the body’s respiratory agency.
resPirAtory Aesthetics And enActive cognition
To flesh out this final claim in just a little more detail, let me return to 
the concept of presence, now engaging with it as the contemporary phi-
losopher Alva Noë thinks about that term. Loosely, for Noë, “presence” 
refers to the way the world shows up for us. In visual perception, that 
includes more than just retinal information: the reverse side of a tomato, 
though not directly seen by me, is still part of my perception of the 
tomato; while strictly invisible, nonetheless it has presence.62 And it has 
presence in virtue of my implicit knowledge that appropriate sensorimo-
tor action (such as rotating it or moving around it) will successfully bring 
that invisible reverse side of the tomato into view. In Varieties of Presence 
(2012), Noë develops this approach to presence using, as it happens, the 
example of music:
When you experience the singer’s song, it is the singer herself, as we have 
noticed, that you hear. … Perception is an action of sensorimotor coupling 
with the environment. It is not a type of engagement with mere appear-
ances or qualia. When you attend to the sustained note, what you are thus 
able to establish contact with is the singer’s continuous activity of holding 
the note. The singer and what she’s doing are available to you thanks to 
your situation and your skillful access.63
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Aesthetic empathy as Vernon Lee presents it similarly involves an “action 
of sensorimotor coupling with the environment”—though, as I will sug-
gest in a moment, she reaches beyond Noë in an interesting way, too. 
Musical experience, being usefully direct and immediate for Noë, illus-
trates something salient about the general way all perception works on 
his model of enactivist cognitive science: it typically gets accomplished 
without mental representation (“appearances or qualia”) and can instead 
be explained through tacit bodily knowledge. We “access” music by 
coupling with it, in ways that our embodied minds have learned to do. 
Music itself “entrains” us, in return: listening to it involves the “align-
ment or coordination of bodily features with recurrent features of the 
environment,” explains another enactivist philosopher, Joel Krueger.64 
If enactivism accepts the “premise that self is embedded in world and 
world in self,” as Katherine Hayles puts it in Unthought (2017), her 
study of the cognitive nonconscious, then one could add that this would 
not have sounded drastically new to proponents of Victorian psycholog-
ical aesthetics.65 For Lee, as we have seen, art achieves presence because 
it engages us in modes of doing, in sensorimotor action, not least the 
semi-conscious work of responsive breathing.
Music, an artistic medium especially close to the movement of breath, 
has a special status in Lee’s writing on aesthetics, from the beginnings 
of her literary career. Without coincidence, her last book focused solely 
on music. Music and Its Lovers (1932) is also a methodological curiosity, 
given its proximity to European phenomenology, being a study of data 
gathered from respondents’ questionnaires.66 But already in that early vol-
ume Belcaro she had complained about aestheticians “not listening to the 
music” of pictures.67 Her later accounts of painting and visual form retain, 
as Nicholas Dames has rightly noted, an insistence on music as a basic 
model of formal patterning in general.68 In “Chapelmaster Kreisler,” an 
essay in Belcaro (its title a reference to E. T. A. Hoffmann’s fictional half-
mad composer Johannes Kreisler), Lee described music as being utterly 
strange, its existence as sound “issuing from nothing and relapsing into 
nothing,” at once our own human creation and yet unfathomably alien: 
“it lives in our breath, yet it seems to come from a distant land which we 
shall never see, and to tell us of things we shall never know.”69 In enquir-
ing of the origins of music—and elsewhere rejecting Herbert Spencer’s 
answer that all aesthetic activity can be traced back, in Lamarckian style, 
to play—Lee adopts the view that music addresses us with its sonic, yet 
non-semantic, force. From some impossible place, it entrains us:
82  P. gArrAtt
We ourselves have constant opportunities of remarking the intense emo-
tional effects due to mere pitch, tone, and rhythm; that is to say, to the 
merely physical qualities of number, nature, and repetition of musical vibra-
tions. We have all been cheered by the trumpet and depressed by the haut-
boy; we have felt a wistful melancholy steal over us while listening to the 
drone of bagpipe and the quaver of the flute of the pifferari at the shrine; we 
have felt our heart beat and our breath halt on catching the first notes of an 
organ as we lifted the entrance curtain of some great cathedral.70
In Strange Tools (2015), his book on art, Noë says something wholly 
compatible with this, if not virtually identical. Why is music enthralling? 
“Because,” he says, “we are rhythmically and melodically and tonally 
organized; this is a fundamental feature of our embodied living. Music 
investigates these ways.”71 As for Noë, Lee’s earlier version of this style 
of thought takes music and aesthetic experience more widely to be 
learned, implicit, lived practices, not prizes of evolutionary develop-
ment, whether Darwinian or Spencerian, thereby enabling us to see art 
as something that we do.
If one suspects, in places, that Noë’s enactivist account of aesthetic 
forms is prone to arrive at tautology—something along the lines of 
(though this is unfairly reductive) “art is a tool that affords art experi-
ences”—then Lee’s detailed ideas of empathetic identification might 
come to its aid, even perhaps adding a more nuanced and radical fla-
vour to the sensorimotor enactivist position. For the likes of Noë and 
Krueger, art is an external resource, an entity with certain intrin-
sic qualities that we can do things with, or that afford action. To stay 
with the example of music, it has timbre, pitch, rhythm, variation and 
so forth. Krueger speaks of “sonic invariants,” those “structural features 
of the music that specify an array of possible perceptual interactions.”72 
Empathy, on the other hand, as Lee develops it, puts in question the 
extent to which these features are “in” the musical structure itself or 
rather unnoticed habitual attributions of initially unconscious bodily 
affects. The “fast tempo” of a musical piece is an evaluative phrase, not 
a value-neutral one, conventionally attributing motion to an inanimate 
series of individual sound units. “Fast” denotes the empathetic transfer 
of a primary physiological arousal, now no longer identified with the 
body and instead discovered as intrinsic to the music. In other words, 
the external acoustic structure, supposedly made up of invariants, already 
bears the imprint of interaction, one occurring at the automatic and sub-
personal level of the breath and motor balance.73
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In suggesting this, I am neither labelling Vernon Lee a sensorimotor 
enactivist nor staking a claim on her extraordinary prescience, both of 
which would be historically self-serving gestures. Pursuing Lee’s relation 
to these present debates has value, to my mind, only to the extent that 
it brings into sharper focus something of her own way of thinking about 
art and embodiment. What this chapter has tried to do is establish the 
ways in which Lee’s ideas of breathing and artistic creaturely flourishing 
established a framework of respiratory aesthetics that emerged from var-
ious sources in mid- and late-Victorian culture and yet also overspilled 
the containers of period boundaries, categories of art and science and dif-
ferent critical and artistic movements. It gave physical meaning to Walter 
Pater’s admiring gloss of Plato: “It is not so much the matter of the work 
of art, what is conveyed in and by colour and form and sound, that tells 
upon us educationally … as the form, and its qualities, concision, sim-
plicity, rhythm, or, contrariwise, abundance, variety, discord.”74 A sense 
of unconscious embodied empathy with things and persons is there in 
Pater’s reading of Platonic mimicry, too (“we imitate unconsciously the 
line and colour of the walls around us”).75 Meanwhile, a language of 
unconscious cerebration and unfelt feelings, derived from Victorian psy-
chology and theories of reflex action, were picked up by aesthetic debates 
in the 1860s and flowed on through the rhetoric of literary and critical 
impressionism and its decadent afterlife, as in those highlighted breathy 
moments in Henry James and Edith Wharton. And there was, of course, 
Ruskin, too. “There is, in all art,” Lee affirmed as late as 1912, “what 
Ruskin called the Lamp of Life; and it is with it that my aesthetics deal.”76 
If disentangling art from Ruskin’s dubious moralism and mystification 
meant returning, as if pre-reflectively, to the nature of its presence, as Lee 
had announced in 1881, then this did not end up dispelling Ruskinism 
altogether. Far from it: the Ruskin who spoke of vital breath remained 
compatible with the world-involving action of empathy she collaboratively 
formulated. Like Ruskin, acculturating the instinctual will was a laudable 
thing. And, in broad strokes, that point locates both writers in a larger 
story of respiratory aesthetics at the end of the nineteenth century, a story 
which is now, like breath itself, only just becoming visible.
notes
 1.  Dallas (1852, 270–271).
 2.  Ruskin (1903–1912, 19: 328–329).
84  P. gArrAtt
 3.  James (1963, 86).
 4.  The research for this chapter came about through happy association with 
Durham’s “Life of Breath” project, funded by the Wellcome Trust, and I 
wish to thank Corinne Saunders and Jane Macnaughton for inviting me 
to contribute to its launch event on 15 September 2015.
 5.  Only moments before making this connection between subjective impres-
sions and the breath, James famously describes experience as always unlim-
ited and incomplete, “the very atmosphere of the mind” (James 1963, 85). 
This section of “The Art of Fiction” flits suggestively between signifiers of 
solidity (tissue, particles and pulses) and airiness (breath and atmosphere), 
ultimately overlaying or blending these seemingly distinct registers.
 6.  See Dames (2007) and Morgan (2017).
 7.  See Rudy (2009) and Hall (2017).
 8.  The best recent literary biography of Vernon Lee is Colby (2003).
 9.  A very helpful account of Lee’s relation to these psychological traditions is 
given in Burdett (2011).
 10.  Lee (1881, 225).
 11.  Ibid., 226.
 12.  Ibid., 227.
 13.  Ibid., 229.
 14.  Ibid., 12–13.
 15.  Ibid., 10–11.
 16.  Lee (1933, 23). Music, Lee acknowledges, is the exemplary art form here, 
and the “clue to the study of all other branches of art,” since its material 
“evanescence” establishes mostly clearly that art is definable as the “spe-
cial group of responses which it is susceptible of awakening in the mind 
of its audience.”
 17.  The relevant well-known passage from Pater’s “Preface” to Studies in 
the History of the Renaissance reads: “in aesthetic criticism the first step 
towards seeing one’s object as it really is, is to know one’s own impres-
sion as it really is, to discriminate it, to realise it distinctly” (Pater 1873, 
viii). Pater’s stress on knowing and defining one’s impressions (suggest-
ing an inner representational theatre) should, I suggest, be distinguished 
from Vernon Lee’s emphasis on sensorimotor movements and reflex 
action (like respiration) which may occur either unconsciously or as con-
scious feeling, and this matters to her view of aesthetic experience as a 
mode of action rather than (I claim) representation.
 18.  The phrase is Pater’s, from an essay on Coleridge originally published in 
1866, in which he defines modern thought by its “relative spirit” and 
declares Coleridge, in contrast, to have been enslaved by the absolute. 
See Pater (1889, 65–67). For an exploration, and a defence, of relativism 
in nineteenth-century culture and ideas, see Herbert (2001).
4 OUT OF BREATH: RESPIRATORY AESTHETICS …  85
 19.  Hannah (2013, 54).
 20.  Pater speaks of “that thick wall of personality through which no real voice 
has ever pierced on its way to us, or from us to that which we can only 
conjecture to be without [i.e. outside us]” (Pater 1873, 209).
 21.  Unless otherwise stated, I intend the term “cognition” to encompass 
more than rational behavior, knowing, reasoning, reflecting, prob-
lem-solving and so forth, and for it to be applied in the flexible fashion 
of many leading philosophers and cognitive theorists, particularly those 
interested in embodied cognition; for a helpful discussion of the “open-
door policy” on what counts as cognition, see Wheeler (2005, 3–5).
 22.  For responses to the charge of solipsism levelled against Pater’s aesthet-
icism, see Levine (2000) and Morgan (2010), both of whom discuss 
Pater’s interests in Victorian science and materialism. Vernon Lee’s 
concept of aesthetic empathy, informed by the notion of feeling-into 
(Einfühlung) developed by the German philosopher Robert Vischer, is 
discussed in the following section of the chapter. My claim about active 
coupling, which draws on approaches to the mind labelled as “4E” theo-
ries of cognition (embodied, embedded, enactive and extended), is devel-
oped in the third section.
 23.  Morgan (2017, 153).
 24.  Wharton (1903, 513).
 25.  Huxley (1866, 285–286). See also Winter (1998, 327–328).
 26.  Huxley (1866, 285).
 27.  Carpenter first used unconscious cerebration in his Principles of Human 
Physiology (1854), though it tends to be associated with his popular book, 
Principles of Mental Physiology (1874). The idea was widely adopted. 
For a wide-ranging discussion of it under the rubric of “thinking without 
thinking,” in Victorian intellectual life and in the novel, see Ryan (2012). 
Ryan, interestingly, does not mention Vernon Lee in this connection.
 28.  Dallas (1866, 243).
 29.  Ibid., 243.
 30.  Lewes (1859–1860, 2: 198).
 31.  Lewes (1859–1860, 1: 403–404).
 32.  Bain (1872, 15).
 33.  Dallas (1866, 245).
 34.  Ibid., 259.
 35.  Ibid., 242–243. Gertrud Mara (1749–1833) had been a court singer for 
Frederick the Great before making her London debut in 1784 and was 
widely praised for the brilliance of her vocal technique.
 36.  Ibid., 242.
 37.  Ibid., 243. Dallas quotes a lengthy corroborating passage from Ruskin’s 
The Two Paths (1859) at the end of this part of The Gay Science.
86  P. gArrAtt
 38.  Ruskin (1903–1912, 16: 419).
 39.  Ruskin (1903–1912, 16: 376–378).
 40.  Ruskin (1903–1912, 16: 383, 384).
 41.  If not quite gushing, Dallas makes no effort to disguise his high esti-
mation of Ruskin’s rhetorical style and “clear-seeing mind” in Modern 
Painters (1843–60) and his “magnificent” theory of the imagination 
(Dallas 1866, 192–193).
 42.  See Morgan (2017, 28–29).
 43.  Ruskin (1903–1912, 19: 360), my emphasis.
 44.  Lee (1913, 63). See also Keen (2007, 55–56).
 45.  Identification, Frow suggests, has been inflected by historical discourses of 
sympathy (and empathy), since the eighteenth century, whereas “affective 
investment may be positive or negative, and indeed encompasses a range 
of possible relations to characters, including dislike and indifference” 
(Frow 2014, 37–38).
 46.  Lee (1913, 69).
 47.  Ibid., 65–66.
 48.  As David M. Craig has argued, Ruskin’s corrective for the pathetic fal-
lacy—that is, for the failings of pathos manifested in bending objects 
to the perceiver’s will—was reverence, and my own contention is that 
Vernon Lee’s understanding of aesthetic empathy in 1913 retains an 
important sense of reverential self-abnegation, if in a different rhetorical 
register (see Craig 2006, 136).
 49.  Lee (1913, 68). See Lakoff and Johnson (1980).
 50.  Lee (1913, 139–140).
 51.  Lee and Anstruther-Thomson make this clear quite early on in their essay 
“Beauty and Ugliness,” originally published in 1897 in the Contemporary 
Review (see Lee and Anstruther-Thomson 1912, 170–171). Here, they 
are making an implicit reference to Grant Allen, who had opened his 
Physiological Aesthetics (1877) by attacking Ruskin’s failure in volume one 
of Modern Painters (1843) to say why certain visual forms bring pleasure. 
Lee and her collaborator, it should be noted, are choosing not to side 
not with Allen, who used evolutionary theory to explain this, but rather 
with Ruskin. They quote Ruskin’s dictum that “beauty and ugliness are 
as positive in their nature as pleasure and pain,” from Modern Painters III 
(Ruskin 1903–1912, 5: 45). On Lee and Allen, see also Burdett (2011).
 52.  Lee (1913, 109).
 53.  The Beautiful contains this moment of mild, if sincere, anti-bourgeois 
snobbery: “The very worst attitude towards art is that of the holi-
day-maker who comes into its presence with no ulterior interest or busi-
ness, and nothing but the hope of an aesthetic emotion which is most 
often denied him” (Lee 1913, 138).
 54.  Lee and Anstruther-Thomson (1912, 154).
4 OUT OF BREATH: RESPIRATORY AESTHETICS …  87
 55.  See Burdett (2011).
 56.  Lee and Anstruther-Thomson (1912, 163–164).
 57.  Ibid., 168–169.
 58.  How this occurs remains unclear, in virtue of its inaccessibility to intro-
spection: “This realisation of distance is greatly reinforced by the adjust-
ments taking place in the diaphragm. We do not pretend to explain what 
is really taking place in our body” (ibid., 213–214).
 59.  Ibid., 204.
 60.  Ibid., 224–225.
 61.  Ibid., 230–231, 280.
 62.  This example is discussed at length in Noë (2012).
 63.  Noë (2012, 80).
 64.  Krueger (2011, 9).
 65.  Hayles (2017, 62).
 66.  The opening section of the book, on “Aims and Methods,” sets itself 
against Bertrand Russell and any other “Improbable Reader” who doubts 
such introspective methods (Lee 1933, 18–20).
 67.  Lee (1881, 11).
 68.  Dames (2007, 49).
 69.  Lee (1881, 106), my emphasis.
 70.  Ibid., 119 (emphasis added).
 71.  Noë (2015, 188).
 72.  Krueger (2011, 13).
 73.  This is not, I think, to beg the question by reducing musical sound to 
something in the head, a view that Noë in Strange Tools calls “subjec-
tive, interior, neurological,” identifying it with neuroscientists like Daniel 
Levitin who insist, for example, that pitch refers to mental representation 
since sound waves do not themselves possess pitch (Noë 2015, 183).
 74.  Pater (1893, 245).
 75.  Ibid.
 76.  Lee and Anstruther-Thomson (1912, 80).
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Abstract  Following the path of Charles Olson, Jack Kerouac and Allen 
Ginsberg negotiate breath as a compositional principle for a new particu-
larly American literature. Such a poetics of breathing turns out to be a 
revival of classical thought. For ancient rhetoricians, especially Aristotle, 
Cicero and Quintilian, the breath-pause is constitutive for structuring 
speech. Already in the ancient approaches, a dilemma emerges: breathing 
is supposed to cut speech into well-measured units while physical respira-
tion tends to be irregular. Even though the Beat poets seem to elude this 
problem in their attempt to adapt composition to the writer’s individual 
rhythms, breath, as they theorise it, is a point where bodily processes and 
cultural techniques intersect. The natural, organic body as Kerouac and 
Ginsberg celebrate it invokes a cultural memory, and thus, the idea of a 
purely embodied writing is upset.
Keywords  Breath · Embodied poetics · Jack Kerouac ·  
Allen Ginsberg · Ancient rhetoric
Verse now, 1950, if it is to go ahead, if it is to be of essential use, must, 
I take it, catch up and put into itself certain laws and possibilities of the 
breath, of the breathing of the man who writes as well as of his listenings.1
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The opening claim of Charles Olson’s influential essay “Projective Verse,” 
already touched upon in the introduction of this book, responds to a set 
of questions that would occupy two circles of avant-garde writers in the 
1950s and 1960s, the Black Mountain poets and the Beat movement: 
How can a new literature that radically breaks with tradition be inaugu-
rated? What basis can it have, if not tradition? “The laws and possibilities 
of the breath,” a recourse to “natural” bodily processes, promises freer 
expression and an emancipation of American poetry from old, formal 
conventions. Liberating language from the shackles of fossilised, dusty 
rules of metre and rhyme will vivify and renew it, while transferring the 
author’s breathing rhythm to that of the words written will produce an 
organic, embodied literature that reconciles art and life. In his discus-
sion of breath, Olson refers to the “revolution of the ear,”2 pointing to 
a revival of orality in American poetry starting from Walt Whitman and 
extending to Ezra Pound and William Carlos Williams. His claims that 
“breath allows all the speech-force of language back in” and “speech is … 
the secret of a poem’s energy”3 could be read as a call for spoken liter-
ature, for words carried by physical breath, which are more lively than 
those “which print bred.”4
For a number of writers of both the Beat and Black Mountain con-
text, “speech-force” was not only to be realised in oral performances, but 
should also affect the words in the composition process, in which breath 
would function as a measure that is “arriv[ed] at … organically.”5 Olson, 
like Allen Ginsberg,6 establishes a simple compositional principle: break 
the line when you run out of breath:
And the line comes (I swear it) from the breath, from the breathing of 
the man who writes, at the moment that he writes, … for only he, the 
man who writes, can declare, at every moment, the line its metric and its  
ending—where its breathing, shall come to, termination.7
Similarly, Jack Kerouac proposes that a dash shall indicate the moment 
between inhalation and exhalation, when breath is drawn, replacing 
the commas and colons that more commonly separate grammatical and 
semantic units.8 In these approaches, “preconceived metrical pattern[s]” 
are counteracted with more irregular, variable and individual structures 
derived from “a source deeper than the mind … the breathing and the 
belly and the lungs.”9
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Ancient origins of the breAth-stoP
What was advocated as a fresh principle for a new literature in the essays, 
writing manuals and oral comments of the Beat and Black Mountain 
writers was actually a tacit renascence of classical thought. In ancient 
rhetoric, the importance of breathing as a bodily prerequisite for oral 
delivery and as a structuring element of speech was stressed by Aristotle, 
Cicero and Quintilian. Breath had a pivotal role in the creation of 
prose rhythm, which the rhetoricians considered as more loosely meas-
ured than poetry. Prose should be structured in sequences, for example 
“periods,” which Aristotle defines as “sentence[s] that [have] a begin-
ning and an end in [themselves].”10 In line with the compositional ideas 
of the Beat and Black Mountain writers, for the rhetoricians breathing 
marks the intervals between structural sequences. Aristotle mentions that 
a period should be delivered “in a breath … taken as a whole”11 and 
Cicero asserts that “there should be in speeches closes [of periods] where 
we may take breath.”12
The period in ancient rhetoric is a clearly defined unit: a segment that 
represents a thought with a beginning and an end. This idea is taken up 
by Ginsberg and Kerouac. Ginsberg claims that the “[b]reath-stop and 
the thought-division could be the same,”13 and Kerouac observes that 
a jazz musician blows “a phrase on his saxophone till he runs out of 
breath, and when he does, his sentence, his statement’s been made … . 
That’s how I therefore separate my sentences, as breath separations of 
the mind.”14 With the assumption that a unit of breath coincides with a 
unit of thought or a completed statement, Kerouac and Ginsberg con-
sciously or unconsciously follow the rhetoricians.15 What Kerouac and 
Ginsberg designate as a poetics of the body meets an old matter of con-
troversy around the sound execution of artistic composition and some-
times unpredictable physical needs. The question arising for the ancient 
rhetoricians, Kerouac and Ginsberg, is: How does the necessity of draw-
ing a breath while speaking undercut claims to a synchronicity of breath-
ing and thinking?16
The reflections of the rhetoricians indicate that a seamless coincidence 
of sense and breath units cannot be taken for granted.17 In Quintilian’s 
detailed account of how a speech should be delivered orally, it becomes 
obvious that an exact concurrence of breathing pause and the comple-
tion of a period are only an aspirational ideal.18 The rhetoricians gener-
ally argue that the completion of a period should determine the moment 
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when a breath is drawn, and not the other way round. Cicero stresses 
that only the “unskilful and ignorant speaker … measures out the peri-
ods of his speech, not with art, but with the power of his breath.”19 He 
argues that the breathing pause should be motivated by coherent seg-
ments of speech rather than the bodily need to inhale: “there should 
be in speeches closes [of periods] where we may take breath not when 
we are exhausted, … but by the rhythm of language and thoughts.”20 
Quintilian notes that the orators can train their breath through physical 
exercise in order to make it more amenable to the need to mark a period: 
“we ought to exercise it [the breath, or breathing], that it may hold out 
as long as possible.”21
In this respect, Kerouac’s and Ginsberg’s position is diametrically 
opposite: the physical need to draw a breath shall determine the interval 
between thoughts and constitute the structural unit. To repeat, Ginsberg 
claims that the measure of the breath-stop is “arriv[ed] at … organically” 
and rhythmical structures come from “a source deeper than the mind 
… the breathing and the belly and the lungs.” Kerouac stresses that he 
separates his phrases when he “draw[s] a breath”22 like the saxophon-
ist does when “he runs out of breath.”23 However, their commitment 
to what Cicero designates as rude oratory does not resolve the tension 
between the physical necessity to inhale and the breathing pause as a 
structuring principle of speech already present in antiquity. The units 
of thoughts and statements addressed by Kerouac and Ginsberg under-
mine their claim of a compositional principle solely generated from the 
body. In the reference to the coincidence of breathing and structural 
units, the “nature” of their compositional theories as a cultural inher-
itance becomes obvious; the unaddressed yet distinctly audible reso-
nances with ancient rhetoric alone unsettle the idea of an art that comes 
to be in a fully organic manner. In the context of their writings, breath 
does not only refer to the body “of the man who writes,” but also back 
to a rhetorike techne in which they are engaged. What is proposed as a 
means to approach a reconciliation of art and life in fact turns out to 
be a discursive vitalism pointing to an older discourse and cultural tech-
nique in which a seamless coincidence of body and artistic composition 
has already been challenged.
Against the background of this incongruity, this chapter traces the 
contradictions of Ginsberg’s and Kerouac’s notions of a vital, bod-
ily breath-writing. In the comments about their writing process, nei-
ther Ginsberg nor Kerouac give a clear definition of what the proposed 
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segments, the “mind-breaks” or “thought-divisions” in Ginsberg’s case, 
and the “phrases,” “sentences” or “statements” in Kerouac’s case actu-
ally consist in.24 Whether the two writers actually did break up their lines 
or sentences when they had to inhale is impossible to verify in written 
documents. While one can check drafts and manuscripts for where line-
breaks are made and where dashes or other pause markers are inserted, 
this textual geneticism does not demonstrate Kerouac’s and Ginsberg’s 
actual breathing patterns.25 Moreover, their poetics of breath rests on 
collapsing a fundamental difference between oral and written compo-
sition. What the ancient rhetoricians have in mind is a scenario of oral 
composition: the orator composes his sentences as he speaks. In contrast, 
Ginsberg and Kerouac primarily composed in writing: by hand or with a 
typewriter. When the writer “pronounces” the words in his head while 
writing, a need to inhale does not necessarily coincide with the moment 
where a breathing pause would have occurred if the same sentence were 
spoken. In fact, we may place many more words in the span of one 
breath if we pronounce them in our head than if we pronounce them 
orally.26 In contrast to oral composition, in writing, composition is not 
inevitably affected by the necessity to draw a breath: while writing, one 
can inhale without this effecting a pause in the sentence put on paper. 
When breath-measure is applied to written composition, its organic 
foundations disappear. Concerning Kerouac’s and Ginsberg’s texts, one 
observation is obvious: the pause markers almost always seamlessly coin-
cide with grammatical units—so either the “laws … of the breath” were 
ignored in the actual writing process, or they do not structure speech 
differently to standard grammatical units. Moreover, if a healthy body 
also “unconsciously” follows the control of the mind to such a degree 
that breathing adjusts itself to anticipated syntactic breaks, the “laws of 
the breath” may actually (and unintentionally) be the “laws of the mind” 
rather than “a source deeper than the mind.”27
The only documented cases where Ginsberg adopted an oral composi-
tional technique are his so-called auto-poesy tapes. In a lecture, Ginsberg 
later explicates his recording compositions in terms of his theory of the 
mind- and breath-stop:
most machines have a “stop” and a “start” button …, so if you’re actually 
intending to do writing, one way is to use the automatic “control” button 
as the margin of your line … . That is, you’re talking into the machine, 
you don’t have anything to say, so you click it off. Then, when something 
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emerges, when you notice something … – click! Then, when you’re tran-
scribing on a page, … which I’ve done a lot, from ’65 to’70, with a Uher 
machine, you can use the “click” at the end of the tape line, the tape oper-
ation, as your breath stop. … [I]t’s the natural end of the line.28
An investigation of the tapes archived at Stanford University shows that 
what Ginsberg presents here is indeed a theory—a theory that does not 
match his compositional practice. Not only does he rarely use the stop 
and start buttons during composition, but the pauses in the recordings 
do not always coincide with the line-breaks in the printed poems. In 
most cases, it is unlikely that the pauses mark moments where Ginsberg 
ran out of breath; they rather indicate points where he ran out of 
thought: often, he only speaks two or three words, followed by very long 
intervals during which numerous breaths can be taken, often punctured 
by interjections like “ahem.” Consequently, when Ginsberg designates 
the “natural” end of a line as “breath-stop” in retrospect, he uses the 
term as an image for the mind-break, or as a name for the line-break in 
the written text (note that in the lecture, he comes up with breath in the 
context of transcribing the spoken poem), which has little to do with his 
actual breathing during composition.
Following these observations, it has to be stressed that Kerouac’s and 
Ginsberg’s reflections of breathing and writing are poetological theo-
ries rather than descriptions of actual composition processes. While it is 
worth considering these in their own right, it is important to be aware of 
the ambivalent position bodily breath thereby comes to occupy: while it 
is celebrated as the natural source of a literary text’s structure, its actual 
role in the writers’ compositional practices seems to be marginal. Bearing 
this ambivalence in mind, I will elucidate the particularities of Kerouac’s 
and Ginsberg’s poetics of breathing, whose fixation on vitalism turns out 
to be grounded more in discourse than in physiology. The trajectories of 
their respective poetological endeavours become explicit when counter-
pointed against theories of rhetorical composition. Thus, I want to pair 
Ginsberg with Quintilian and Kerouac with Aristotle, focusing especially 
on the character and function of the caesura.
ginsberg And QuintiliAn
Ginsberg claims that the so-called natural speech pauses, which he iden-
tifies with “breath-stops,” “indicate mind-breaks.”29 The “[b]reath 
stop is where you stop the phrase to breathe again. Stop to think and 
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breathe.”30 By claiming that “you’re gonna stop and take a breath” 
when “you run out of thought and words,”31 he recalls Quintilian, who 
argues that the pause is the “point, where the mind takes a breath and 
recovers its energy.”32 For Quintilian, the breathing pause is the moment 
“when the rush of words comes to a halt”33 and the mind is relieved 
from its work. The pause should provide a rest so that the orators can 
assemble their mental forces anew before the next compositional effort. 
When claiming that the mind takes a breath, Quintilian deploys a met-
aphor invoking the intake of vital breath.34 He addresses the “rush of 
the words” the pause interrupts and thus recalls a common associa-
tion tied to the metaphor of “taking a breath” in the sense of relaxing: 
slowing down, i.e. the pace of one’s breathing rhythm. To do nothing 
except breathe seems to suggest that one does almost nothing: “taking a 
breath” is “pausing.” The image of the mind taking a breath during the 
pause implicates that the mind stops doing what it usually does, namely 
thinking. By claiming that the mind takes a breath in the moment of 
the breathing pause, Quintilian rhetorically establishes a temporal coin-
cidence of metaphorical breath and its literal, or, precisely speaking 
non-linguistic, bodily referent.
In his remarks on the breathing pause and writing, Ginsberg also tries 
to reconcile metaphorical and literal dimensions of breathing. In the sen-
tence “when you talk and then after a while you run out of thought and 
words, … then you’re going to stop and take a breath and continue,” 
Ginsberg synchronises the metaphor of “taking a breath”35 with phys-
ical inhalation. Like Quintilian, he suggests that the breathing pause 
between uttered words (literally taking a breath) is a moment of rest and 
recovery (metaphorically taking a breath)—and that the mind needs to 
rest when the speaker runs “out of thought.” Ginsberg also addresses 
the other implications of “taking a breath,” discussed in Quintilian’s use 
of the metaphor: inhaling vitalising air and doing almost nothing. He 
states that during the pause, the writer is “waiting for the next thought 
to articulate itself.”36 By noting “you’re improvising and you’re relying 
on the moment-to-moment inspiration,”37 Ginsberg suggests that phys-
ical inspiration, inhaling, coincides with inspiration in the classical sense: 
the generation of creative ideas. The metaphorical breath of life as a vital-
ising force is thus transferred to the domain of artistic work in process. 
Drawing on his preoccupation with Buddhist thought and meditation 
practices, Ginsberg considers it relevant that ideas are generated where 
nothing is written or thought. The “blank spots,” or “gaps in between 
the thoughts,”38 Ginsberg addresses in this context overlap exactly with 
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the point where he locates the breath-stop. Out of the “unborn aware-
ness,”39 a space of pure potentiality that opens in the moment when we 
do nothing but breathe, new thoughts are generated. The conflation 
of the physiological process of breathing, that is, the so-called natural 
pause or breath-stop and the mind-break, with the emergence of new 
ideas, that is, inspiration, becomes most noticeable in his “Notes on 
Howl”: “Ideally each line of Howl is a single breath unit … —that’s the 
Measure, one physical-mental inspiration of thought contained in the 
elastic of a breath.”40
Even though Ginsberg encourages his readers to take both the met-
aphor of “taking a breath” and the notion of inspiration literally, his 
theory pushes physical respiration into the background. The claim that 
breath is a “source deeper than the mind” is made plausible in Ginsberg’s 
comments on thought-generating “unborn awareness.” However, rec-
onciling breathing and inspiration in this way does not explain why the 
end of a thought should coincide with the need to draw a breath. The 
neat outline of “breath-stop = mind-break = inspiration” is an attempt 
to bring the body into agreement with compositional techniques, tra-
ditional ideas about how creative works are generated and theories of 
thought processes. Such a carefully constructed model—clearly a work of 
a well-read mind—stands in conflict with the claim that the work of the 
respiratory organs, which proceeds according to its own mechanisms, is 
supposed to generate the rhythmical structures of the poem in process. 
The fact that breathing rhythms are influenced by accidental external cir-
cumstances and the respective bodily condition of the breather—which, 
quite surprisingly for a position that supposedly foregrounds the body, 
is never addressed by Ginsberg—counteracts the idea that “mind-breaks” 
should necessarily be “identical with natural speech pauses.”41 On the 
one hand, it is precisely the irregularity of breathing that makes it inter-
esting for Ginsberg’s polemic towards a new poetry: he stresses that, 
in contrast to the “automatic and mechanic,” symmetrical and “even” 
measure of traditional metrical forms, poetry as he envisages it, “speech 
as breath from the body,” is more variably structured.42 On the other 
hand, the irregularities of a human’s breathing rhythm run counter to 
the smooth symmetry Ginsberg establishes in his compositional the-
ory. Ginsberg considers the work of the mind as a process which is at 
the same time bodily and intellectual.43 His negotiations of breath and 
mind-breaks thus challenge a simple binary between a rational, intellec-
tual mind and an irrational, animalistic body. However, the cost of this 
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by all means productive questioning of a dualism that keeps haunting 
the Western world is an eradication of difference: Ginsberg seals the gap 
between mind and body that especially articulates itself when the body 
speaks, or to be precise, breathes. He claims that mind-breaks are the 
same as non-metaphorical breath-stops, that is, the pauses between inha-
lation and exhalation in the physical respiration process.
kerouAc And Aristotle
Kerouac first and foremost links breathing to the free mind-flow and 
uncensored expression:
PROCEDURE … sketching language is undisturbed flow from the mind 
of personal secret idea-words, blowing (as per jazz musician) on subject of 
image.
SCOPING Not “selectivity” of expression but following free deviation 
(association) of mind into limitless blow-on-subject seas of thought, swim-
ming in sea of English with no discipline other than rhythms of rhetorical 
exhalation and expostulated statement … —Blow as deep as you want—
write as deeply, fish as far down as you want.44
CENTER OF INTEREST … blow!—now!—your way is your only way—
“good”—or “bad”—always honest (“ludicrous”), spontaneous, “confes-
sional” interesting, because not “crafted.”45
The most obvious basis for the comparison of mind-flow and breath is 
a term Kerouac adopts from jazz music: “blowing.” In jazz, “blowing” 
refers to improvisation.46 In the case of the improvised saxophone-solo 
Kerouac addresses in his Paris Review interview, such an improvisation 
is literally blown. With respect to the breath-carried sounds produced by 
the saxophonist and, by analogy, by the speaker who improvises literary 
texts, Kerouac’s image has a physiological basis. However, the suggested 
continuity of the flow of the mind and breathing is as rhetorically con-
structed as Ginsberg’s equation of breath-stop and mind-break. This 
analogy is informed by the idea that physical breathing happens uncon-
sciously and thus escapes from those grammatical and syntactical rules 
that restrict the mind’s free expression—prohibitions the conscious mind 
cannot ignore. Further, the flow of exhaled air lends itself to a compari-
son with the stream of consciousness.
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Kerouac extends the analogy between breath and a liberated mind to 
language: the free flow of the mind shall be mirrored in the free flow 
of language. Kerouac does not go so far as to propose a purely fluent, 
unsegmented speech or writing. His alternative is to replace the barri-
ers of conventional punctuation mirroring grammatical units with a less 
restraining separator, namely breath.
No periods separating sentence-structures already arbitrarily riddled by 
false colons and timid usually needless commas—but the vigorous space 
dash separating rhetorical breathing (as jazz musician drawing breath 
between outblown phrases)—47
While the ancient rhetoricians make a considerable effort to reconcile 
the breathing pause and grammatical units in their arguments, Kerouac 
is eager to separate the two. In ancient rhetoric, the image of flowing 
water, which Kerouac invokes in the “flow” and the “seas” of language, 
is used in order to depict what is spoken between the pauses: Quintilian 
mentions “the unbroken flow of the voice … being carried along down 
the stream of oratory”48 and Cicero compares ongoing speech with 
“the rolling stream of a river.”49 In both cases, the breathing pause is 
what brings that flow to a halt. Even though he takes the caesura into 
account, Kerouac’s reservations against anything that disturbs the flow 
are apparent.
In the unpublished essay “History of the Theory of Breath as a 
Separator of Statements in Spontaneous Writing,” Kerouac extends his 
comparison of breath-measure to jazz music: in a handwritten addition, 
the jazz musician is equated with both a runner and orator, and jazz is 
mentioned in the same breath with oratory and a hundred-yard dash. 
The imperative “write excitedly, swiftly”50 became the foundation of the 
most prominent Beat and Kerouac-myth,51 culminating in the repeat-
edly invoked scene of Kerouac taping together sheets of paper to a long 
scroll in order to avoid interruptions before manically typing down On 
the Road in three weeks.52 In Kerouac’s discussion of running, pausing 
and writing, we find a striking echo of Aristotle. Aristotle argues that, in 
contrast to a style segmented by periods, colons and commas, the loose 
or continuous style is “unpleasant, because it is endless, for all wish to 
have the end in sight.”53 He gives the following reason for the benefits 
of the pause: “runners, just when they have reached the goal, lose their 
breath and strength, whereas before, when the end is in sight, they show 
5 EBB AND FLOW: BREATH-WRITING FROM ANCIENT RHETORIC …  101
no signs of fatigue.”54 The advantage of the pause is that it prevents 
fatigue, the loss of breath, and that it impels the runner to go on. In 
his argument for pauses, Aristotle looks at them prospectively, as some-
thing that lies ahead. Such a prospective view opens a very attractive pos-
sibility for Kerouac: the break no longer blocks the flow, but generates 
an impetus to speed on. In a letter to his agent Sterling Lord, Kerouac 
stresses that the dashes indicating the breathing pause mark something 
impending: “Make this clear, that my prose is a series of rhythmic expos-
tulations of speech visually separated for the convenience of the reader’s 
eye by dashes, by vigorous definite dashes, which can be seen coming 
as you read.”55 Kerouac also highlights the importance of looking ahead 
during composition in “History of the Theory of Breath”: analogous to 
the writer of spontaneous prose, the jazz musician has to keep track of 
breath when he moves from one chorus to the next in order to create a 
continuity between segments.
For Kerouac, the pause as such, the moment when according to 
Aristotle the runners “lose their breath and strength,” represents the 
most delicate moment in his theory of writing. Whereas Ginsberg empha-
sises the meditative potentiality of the pause as a moment of calmness and 
rest, Kerouac is focused on the speed of the flowing words.56 The idea of 
resting in the sense of slackening poses a threat to his obsession with mas-
tery and an intact, potent masculine body mirrored in a muscular, virile 
prose.57 The aspired athletic speed of writing should demonstrate vigour. 
Kerouac claims that he wants to write “[l]ike Proust, but on the run, a 
Running Proust.”58 “I decided to do just like he did—but fast. … Fast. 
Marcel Proust had asthma and was lying around writing and eating in 
bed. Once in a while he’d get up feebly, put on a coat and go down a bar 
in Paris.”59 Just like Proust, Kerouac wants to write a monumental cycle 
of novels covering his entire life—but he neither wants to spend as much 
time as Proust did on the Recherche,60 nor, most importantly, to fail in 
accomplishing the oeuvre. His comments show that in wishing to be a 
“running Proust,” Kerouac also wanted to ensure that he didn’t mimic 
Proust’s frailty. What Kerouac aspires to is an athletic writing in contrast 
to an asthmatic one.61 The breath Kerouac wishes to incorporate in his 
writing is one of a healthy, well-trained, potent body. It is significant that, 
in his emphasis on speed, Kerouac conceals the fact that a strained body 
may be out of breath, or that speaking on the run could be controlled by 
strained breath.62 A breath that indicates signs of the body’s slackening 
or weakens it, a writing structured by asthma attacks and apnoea would 
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endanger Kerouac’s poetological pursuits. In other words, Kerouac 
 cannot envision breathlessness in his poetic theory. A physiological foun-
dation of writing is only desirable if the body in question is intact and dis-
ciplined into athletic strength. Spontaneous writing as such is considered 
as a result of discipline, or, to follow Kerouac’s own image, the runner’s 
sprint provides an immediate demonstration of what rigorous training 
and hardening muscles give rise to.
… the critics have failed to realize that spontaneous writing of narrative 
prose is infinitely more difficult than careful slow painstaking writing 
with opportunities to revise—Because spontaneous writing is an ordeal 
requiring immediate discipline—They seem to think there’s no discipline 
involved—They don’t know how horrible it is to learn immediate and swift 
discipline and draw your breath in pain as you do so.63
Spontaneous prose is described as the empowering accomplishment of 
hard work. The aching breath recalling Shakespeare’s Hamlet64 results 
from the exertion of a well-trained body and stands in contrast to the 
painful asthmatic breath exhausting a body subject to illness. The refer-
ence to Proust’s asthma and his debilitated physical condition shows 
Kerouac’s longing for mastery over his body and writing alike: the healthy 
and strong body is a body under command.65 The athlete’s control over 
his muscles creates the illusion that he is liberated from the more random 
works of the body that may affect a person (i.e. illness). The imperatives 
of a “defective” body have no place in Kerouac’s theory of writing.
Consequently, Kerouac invests the breathing pauses with implications 
forbidding any possibility that they may be a symptom of the fatigued 
body. In this respect, it is significant how he describes the graphical sign 
that should mark the breathing pause and its function:
No periods separating sentence-structures already arbitrarily riddled by 
false colons and timid usually needless commas—but the vigorous space 
dash separating rhetorical breathing.66
… a sentence which after all is a rhetorical expostulation based on breath-
ing and has to end, and I make it end with a vigorous release sign, i.e., the 
dash—67
By repeatedly describing the dash as “vigorous” (in contrast to the 
“timid” commas), Kerouac projects the strength of the runner into the 
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pause, the moment when his body is in danger of collapsing and his mus-
cles are bound to go limp. The aim of associating the pause with virility 
motivates the choice of the dash as the sign marking it on a semantic 
and graphical level: “dash” designates the punctuation mark Kerouac 
uses, but also the runner’s sprint. Through the “dash,” the pause devel-
ops a sense of speeding on. In Kerouac’s handwritten manuscripts, the 
dashes also evoke an impression of speed graphically: often, the lines 
look as if they were dashed off energetically. Visually, the dash—in this 
case especially the printed one—establishes a proximity between words 
it separates: it links them by a vertical line almost touching their respec-
tive ends and beginnings, so that the eye is invited to follow this connec-
tion. Whereas a blank space between words encourages the eye to pause, 
the dash rather incites the eye to sprint between words. Moreover, in 
contrast to the bent commas and colons, the erect straight line of dash, 
which is also bigger in size, has a phallic quality. When his editor at the 
Grove Press, Don Allen, replaced dashes by full stops and added commas 
in the manuscript of The Subterraneans, Kerouac complained about this 
“horrible castration job.” “He has broken down the organic strength of 
the manuscript and it is no longer THE SUBTERRANEANS by Jack K, 
but some feeble something by Don Allen.”68
Such a castration anxiety also explains why Kerouac mingles images of 
breath and sex in the “Essentials”:
… write outwards swimming in sea of language to peripheral release and 
exhaustion—69
… write excitedly, swiftly, with writing-or-typing-cramps, in accordance 
(as from center to periphery) with laws of orgasm … . Come from within, 
out—to relaxed and said.70
“[E]xhaustion,” which in terms of respiration represents a threat— 
i.e. Proust’s asthmatic feebleness and Aristotle’s drained runner who has 
lost his “breath and strength”—is redirected to the domain of sexual cli-
max: Kerouac links the “relaxed” moment of the pause to an explosive 
“release” of male (creative) potency. Kerouac repeatedly writes that the 
dashes “release” the sentence. Beside the sexual connotations evoked in 
the “Essentials,” “release” also designates “liberation,” the “action of 
freeing, or the fact of being freed.” Moreover, in jazz music, “release” 
designates a “passage of music that serves as a bridge between repetitions 
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of a main melody.”71 By choosing the word “release” in order to 
describe the function of the dash, Kerouac is able to connect all the qual-
ities he wants to project into the breathing pause in order not to make it 
appear as slackening or escaping mastery: virility, liberation and a sense 
of continuity pointing forward to the point after the critical moment of 
the pause. The word also contains Kerouac’s most eager wish: to make 
his writing available to the public, to release his written products, to get 
published and be honoured as America’s healthy Proust. Kerouac’s com-
ments on his writing processes and methods, above all the “Essentials,” 
were most important elements in his attempt to create a public image of 
himself as a writer. The potent, vigorously breathing body of the author-
itative and controlling author Kerouac promotes is produced by his own 
words. Kerouac’s literary texts are constructed in a way that evokes the 
impression of spontaneous, bodily, athletic writing executed by a vig-
orous author. The comments on the writing process and methods are 
designed to verify and confirm—and not least co-create—the effect pro-
duced in the literary texts.72
The texts by the ancient rhetoricians, Ginsberg and Kerouac, all 
imagine the writing or speaking body. In their discussions of the role 
of breath in writing, especially concerning the breathing pause, both 
Kerouac and Ginsberg follow in the footsteps of the rhetoricians. 
Whereas their poetological reflections start from the same premises, 
they ultimately diverge. Ginsberg’s negotiation of the breathing pause 
amounts to a meditatively charged stasis, he emphasises the role of qui-
escent contemplation. Contrarily, Kerouac’s poetics of breathing culmi-
nates in a promotion of flow, fast movement and virile athleticism.
notes
 1.  Olson (1966, 15).
 2.  Ibid., 15.
 3.  Ibid., 20.
 4.  Ibid., 15. Even though Olson stresses orality in “Projective Verse,” it is 
not his only concern, or even a primary one. As Raphael Allison notes in 
his book Bodies on the Line: Performance and the Sixties Poetry Reading, 
“competing with Olson’s emphasis on the breath, graphic text itself was 
to him of equal value” (68). Prescient to the authors to be discussed in 
more detail in this article and their relation to orality, it has to be noted 
that Jack Kerouac did refer to spoken language and the tongue in his 
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of the Theory of Breath as a Separator of Statements in Spontaneous 
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ken word is much stronger: he repeatedly stresses its importance in his 
interviews (e.g. 2001, 81, 158, 272), and—as a grandfather of contem-
porary poetry slams—presenting his poetry orally to a live audience was 
a priority in his literary endeavours. The legendary reading of “Howl” at 
the Six Gallery is only one example.
 5.  Ginsberg (2001, 19).
 6.  “Ideally each line of Howl is a single breath unit. … My breath is long—
that’s the measure, one physical-mental inspiration of thought contained 
in the elastic of a breath” (Ginsberg 1999, 416). “So you arrange the 
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 7.  Olson (1966, 19).
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ancient rhetoric from my article “animi velut respirant. Rhythm and 
Breathing Pauses in Ancient Rhetoric, Virginia Woolf and Robert Musil.”
 13.  Ginsberg (2001, 359).
 14.  Kerouac (1968).
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may have been familiar with their ideas through secondary sources.
 16.  Regarding the empirical perspective on this matter, a study conducted 
at Northeastern University by François Grosjean and Maryann Collins 
from 1979 approaching the question “What is the relationship between 
linguistic structure and breathing?” (100) concludes that breathing 
pauses “occur mainly at major constituent breaks” (110). “[T]he need 
to breathe (at least at slow and normal rates) is not in control of pausing 
but … on the contrary, breathing adjusts itself to pause patterns” (109). 
Only when the participants of the study were asked to speak very fast, 
their breathing pauses did not coincide with syntactic breaks: at faster 
rates “the physiological need to breathe forces the speaker to stop in 
order to inhale,” disregarding syntactic units (112). It has to be men-
tioned that the study is based on the speaking of healthy participants who 
were asked to read a text in which punctuation marks indicated where 
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results  cannot be transferred seamlessly to the scenario of oral composi-
tion the rhetoricians and Beat and Black Mountain writers have in mind. 
However, it is revealing that breathing pauses and syntactic units seem 
to co-occur smoothly, but only as long as the body is under control, and 
that the physiological need to inhale tends to interrupt the syntax once 
the circumstances of the bodily condition for some reason changes.
 17.  Cicero attempts to conciliate the physical need to inhale and making a 
pause at the completion of a period by means of a quite constructed argu-
ment that beauty in artificial works is in agreement with natural utility 
(1875, 244).
 18.  Quintilian (1856, 352–353). Also in the passages on composition, there 
are uncertainties about the moment when a breath is required because 
a thought is completed at the moment when the orator should actually 
take a breath: “Who, for example can doubt that there is but one thought 
in the following passage and that it should be pronounced without a halt 
of breath? Still, the groups formed by the first two words, the next three, 
and then again by the next two and three, have each their own special 
rhythm and cause a slight check in our breathing” (Quintilian 1943, 
545).
 19.  Cicero (1875, 243).
 20.  Cicero (1990, 506). The editor’s comment to this passage shows that 
the rhetoricians’ attempts to reconcile the completion of the period with 
the need to inhale leads to inconsistencies: “There is no real, though an 
apparent inconsistency: the periods must furnish opportunity for taking 
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1990, 506).
 21.  Quintilian (1856, 357). This overview of the breathing pause in ancient 
rhetoric is taken from my article “animi velut respirant. Rhythm and 
Breathing Pauses in Ancient Rhetoric, Virginia Woolf and Robert Musil.”
 22.  Kerouac (1999, 15).
 23.  Kerouac (1968), not paginated.
 24.  Even though the examples Ginsberg uses as illustrations in numerous 
interviews and line-breaks or sentence segmentations in Ginsberg’s and 
Kerouac’s literary texts give some indication of these units, a precise 
explication is still lacking.
 25.  Investigating the breath-stops in their oral deliveries, in contrast, is possi-
ble in the cases where recordings were made. In Ginsberg’s recordings of 
Howl, for example, one can observe that the moments when he inhales 
and pauses do not always coincide with the line breaks. Even though 
Ginsberg stresses that he imitates the compositional process in his read-
ings (2001, 126), the readings as such do not constitute valid data for 
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an investigation of the composition process. The only thing one might 
infer from Ginsberg’s Howl readings is that the moments when he has to 
inhale before the line ends show that his breath may not be as long as he 
claims in the Notes for Howl—even though he himself addresses this fact 
and attributes it to his exhaustion at the moment when he was reading 
(2001, 416).
 26.  This may explain Ginsberg’s long lines in Howl, which he cannot pro-
nounce in one breath orally (see 25).
 27.  See 16.
 28.  Ginsberg (1974).
 29.  Ginsberg (2001, 126).
 30.  Ibid., 108.
 31.  Ibid., 359.
 32.  Quintilian (1943, 543).
 33.  Ibid., 543.
 34.  The Latin use of “respire,” the verb used by Quintilian, already included 
the figurative meaning of breathing as resting: “to fetch one’s breath again, 
to recover breath; to recover, revive, be relieved or refreshed after any thing 
difficult (as labor, care, etc.)” (Lewis and Short 1879).
 35.  In the Oxford English Dictionary, “to take breath” is considered to be a 
figurative use of the “[p]ower of breathing, free or easy breathing”: “to 
breathe freely, to recover free breathing, as by pausing after exertion” 
(OED online).
 36.  Ginsberg (2001, 126).
 37.  Ibid., 411.
 38.  Ibid., 365.
 39.  Ibid.
 40.  Ginsberg (1999, 416).
 41.  Ginsberg (2001, 126). In the Q&A session of lecture given in 1974, 
Ginsberg puts this claim into perspective and admits that his conceptions 
of mind units and breath units are not fully fleshed out. A student asked 
how Ginsberg uses his breath when he writes in a notebook: “do you 
read it out loud as you’re writing it down?” In reply, Ginsberg mentions 
“It’s an interesting thing whether it’s breath or it’s mind unit. I never fig-
ured that out” (Ginsberg 1974).
 42.  Ginsberg (2001, 107).
 43.  Ibid., 145.
 44.  Kerouac (1992, 57), my emphasis.
 45.  Ibid., 58, italics in the original.
 46.  Witmer (2003).
 47.  Kerouac (1992, 57).
 48.  Quintilian (1943, 541).
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 49.  Cicero (1875, 247).
 50.  Kerouac (1992, 58).
 51.  Kerouac himself spent considerable efforts to create and maintain that 
myth, which for him goes hand in hand with having found his own 
style and “voice,” most prominently expressed in the “Essentials.” 
Significantly, the “Essentials” constitute an instruction to imitate, circu-
late and popularize the style Kerouac discovered for himself.
 52.  It has long been known that this is not an accurate description of how 
On the Road came to be and that Kerouac spent years taking notes and 
designing drafts for the novel (cf., for example Brinkley 2004, xxv).
 53.  Aristotle (1926, 387).
 54.  Ibid.
 55.  Kerouac (1999, 11).
 56.  Even though Ginsberg occasionally also refers to speed, for example by 
referring to the next line to be written or read as “next spurt” (2001, 
125), this is never at the centre of his reflections—he rather seems to be 
echoing Kerouac’s ideas of “athletic speech” (Ginsberg 2001, 114) in 
these instances.
 57.  Kerouac stresses these characteristics on a small undated scrap of paper 
containing a list of desirable prose attributes.
 58.  Kerouac (1995, 515).
 59.  Kerouac (2005, 192).
 60.  Kerouac (1995, 515).
 61.  See Benjamin (1968).
 62.  See 16.
 63.  Kerouac (1999, 325).
 64.  “Draw your breath in pain” is, of course, an implicit quote. Kerouac was 
well aware of Hamlet’s last words: he quotes “Absent thee from felicity 
awhile,” the line preceding “And in this harsh world draw thy breath in 
pain,” in a letter to Ginsberg written in 1947 (1995, 122). Moreover, 
in a letter to Neal Cassady in 1950, Kerouac makes an explicit reference 
to Hamlet, precisely when he “discovers” the strenuousness of writing 
spontaneously in one’s own voice: “My important recent discovery and 
revelation is that the voice is all. Can you tell me Shakespeare’s voice per 
se?—Who speaks when Hamlet speaks? HAMLET, not Will Shakespeare 
…. You, man, must write exactly as everything rushes in your head, and 
AT ONCE. The pain of writing is just that” (1995, 233). It is impor-
tant to note that these earliest thoughts on spontaneous prose, in which 
breath is not explicitly mentioned, are inspired by Hamlet’s last sigh.
 65.  In Proust’s Recherche, a notion of mastery is not absent. To the contrary, 
the narrator uses his illness as a means to exert control over the characters 
he interacts with. In particular, in The Captive, the house he cannot leave 
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due to his physical condition becomes a setting where Marcel can subject 
his lover Albertine to his supervision and bend her to his will as well as 
a stage for the dramas he directs. The space he is limited to because of 
his feeble physical condition is totally under Marcel’s control, precisely 
because it is secluded from the contingencies of the outside world. In 
Le Souffle coupé. Respirer et écrire, François-Bernard Michel claims that 
asthma implies a closure of what is supposed to be open: the asthmatic 
closes his bronchia and thus conserves his air, he refuses to exhale (194). 
The intentionality insinuated in Michel’s formulation is problematic, 
but it gets to the heart of Marcel’s attempt of creating an enclosed space 
sealed from exposure to the outside. Thus, Proust’s asthma represents a 
flip side to Kerouac’s poetics of breathing. Not only are the two models 
of literary breathers similarly subject to mystification: the aesthetic ideali-
sation of the fin de siècle decadent in Proust’s case, the phallocentric, vir-
ile daredevil who lives fast and dies young in Kerouac’s case. In contrast 
to the asthmatic, Kerouac’s athletic writing embraces exhalation: “blow-
ing” is the central respirational movement for Kerouac, and it has to be 
noted that in contrast, he is deeply suspicious of inhalation, of everything 
that enters the body from without and is not his own. Through his focus 
on exhalation, Kerouac stages an extension of the self to the outside 
world and is equally paranoid of a possible interference of the outside 
with the self as Proust is. The analogy of his writing and sprinting sup-
ports this: as an anaerobic exercise, the sprint relies on energy resources 
stored in the body—it allows a momentary fantasy of not being depend-
ent on an oxygen supply from without.
 66.  Kerouac (1992, 57), my emphasis.
 67.  Kerouac (1995, 324), my emphasis.
 68.  Kerouac (1995, 11).
 69.  Kerouac (1992, 58).
 70.  Ibid.
 71.  OED online, my emphasis.
 72.  For a more detailed analysis of how the “Essentials of Spontaneous Prose” 
themselves represent a deliberate attempt to create an effect of spontane-
ity that first had to be carefully prepared, see my article “First Thought, 
Best Thought. Improvisation bei Jack Kerouac und Allen Ginsberg.” A 
look at Kerouac’s manuscripts and drafts shows that the methods and 
techniques he proposes in his writing manuals and comments have never 
been consequently applied in his actual writing processes. I investigated 
a large bulk of materials at the Berg Collection of English and American 
Literature, among them drafts for The Subterraneans, On the Road 
and Visions of Gerard. A detailed discussion of these findings, however, 
exceeds the scope of this paper. Generally, it is worth noting that Kerouac 
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made extensive use of “timid commas” and hardly used the dashes in a 
consequential manner (to replace commas, colons or full stops); most 
of the times, one can find a mixture of dashes, commas and full stops. I 
want to give only one example that demonstrates how Kerouac retrospec-
tively—and against his imperative “no revisions” (1992, 57)—aligned his 
texts to his own writing instructions: in order to highlight that he replaces 
full stops by dashes, he consequently changes lowercased words succeed-
ing a dash into capitalized ones in the setting copy of Visions of Gerard.
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Abstract  This chapter considers how thinking about the postcolony 
often invokes a language of breathlessness. Moments of severe breath-
lessness in postcolonial literature and criticism give way to observa-
tions of more systemic distortions in breathing patterns. By tracing the 
breathing metaphors in Salman Rushdie’s The Moor’s Last Sigh, the chap-
ter offers a literary rapprochement to these different understandings of 
postcolonial breathlessness, particularly in the work of Frantz Fanon. It 
demonstrates the importance of the breath metaphor for postcolonial lit-
erature. Reciprocally, such literature shows how the cultural baggage of 
these breath metaphors leads to forms of catachresis and markedness. 
The language of breath and breathlessness often conflates their overlap-
ping meanings in health, hygiene and literature. This chapter shows how 
Rushdie’s work helps to signal these overlapping significances.
Keywords  Salman Rushdie · Breath · The Moor’s Last Sigh · 
Frantz Fanon · A Guide to Health · Postcolonial literature
In the wake of the Black Lives Matter movement, any consideration of 
the literary value of breath must also address how its politics projects 
itself into the postcolony, thought broadly as a condition rather than a 
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geographical locale.1 “I can’t breathe,” repeated Garner as he was pinned 
to the ground in an illegal chokehold by a New York police officer. 
He was killed for what Tony Medina has called, “being black and breath-
ing.”2 Ashon Crawley opens Blackpentecostal Breath by quoting Garner, 
calling the phrase one of the most striking expressions of the devalua-
tion of black lives in the USA today.3 But Crawley also finds in Garner’s 
words an implicit challenge to think otherwise: “a desire for otherwise air 
than what is and has been given, the enunciation, the breathing out the 
strange utterance of otherwise possibility.”4 Under the aegis of “express-
ing experiences of hostile environments and efforts to make life within 
them more liveable,” Jean-Thomas Tremblay argues in his review of 
Crawley’s book, “breath” articulates the somatic effects of subordination 
but it also has an “impulse to create and sustain human relationships.”5 
With this heightened attentiveness to breath in Black Life, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that more attention was paid to Frantz Fanon’s descrip-
tions of postcolonial breathlessness. In Black Skins, White Masks, Fanon 
had taken the cause of revolt in Indochina as being “because quite simply 
it was, in more than one way, becoming impossible for them [the colo-
nised] to breathe.”6 By late 2014, Tremblay argues, “Fanon’s claim was 
resurrected on social media, as an extended version of ‘I can’t breathe.’” 
Moreover, as Tremblay notes, “the subject of the claim had been adapted 
to a more general ‘we’: ‘When we revolt it’s not for a particular culture. 
We revolt simply because, for many reasons, we can no longer breathe.’”7
By revising Fanon’s work, from “them” to “we,” activists could testify 
to their own oppression, while also commenting critically and reflexively 
upon the conditions behind it. In so doing, they relied on a compelling 
politicised image: the person who can no longer breathe. Given the work 
this image is meant to do, and the sensitivity of this work, any purely 
aesthetic engagement with it poses something of an ethical dilemma. An 
aesthetic discussion of Black Lives Matter and Garner’s death risks dis-
simulating the political importance of the former and the real anguish 
of the latter. So as to recall this context without appropriating it, I focus 
on another case of postcolonial breathlessness, where the sufferer him-
self has already mediated his breathlessness through literature: Salman 
Rushdie and his 1995 novel, The Moor’s Last Sigh.
For, if a number of Rushdie’s novels mark the unusual properties of 
breath in providing an interface between the physiological, the meta-
phoric and the linguistic, breath’s permutations are perhaps most empha-
sised in The Moor’s Last Sigh, a multigenerational saga about a family 
of spice merchants, as narrated by their last scion, Moraes Zogoiby.8  
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Breath is marked throughout Rushdie’s Sigh from the playful  opening 
sequences—“when you’re running out of steam, when the puff that 
blows you onward is almost gone, it’s time to make confession” (MLS 
4)—to the final, implacable pilgrimage, made “in spite of these lungs 
that no longer do my bidding” (MLS 433). Many of the narrator’s 
meditations refer explicitly to breath, a reminder to read the novel the-
matically and formally as Moraes’s “last sigh.” Given the emphasis it 
places on breath, the novel invites formal aesthetic responses to its med-
itations on the respiratory. But it also has a clear biographical connec-
tion. As Rushdie himself would recall in his memoir Joseph Anton, The 
Moor’s Last Sigh was written during the fatwa, proclaimed by Ayatollah 
Khomeini in 1989. Like The Moor’s Last Sigh, Rushdie is plagued by 
late-onset asthma, which comes to be associated with the loss of freedom 
he experienced under witness protection in Joseph Anton. When he told 
his security protection that he wanted to leave the house to accept the 
Mythopoeic Fantasy Award for Haroun and the Sea of Stories in 1992,
he inhaled deeply. (His reward for giving up smoking was the arrival of 
late-onset asthma, so he was sometimes short of breath.) ‘You see,’ he said, 
‘I was under the impression that I am a free citizen of a free country, and 
it’s not really for you to allow or not allow me to do anything.’ … ‘In this 
free country,’ he said, ‘I am not a free man.’9
Asthma brings together, in this passage, breath(lessness) and (a lack 
of) freedom. In The Moor’s Last Sigh, a similar incident is given a more 
transhistorical purpose. Consider the moment when Moraes’s father, 
Abraham, first hears the story of Boabdil the Unlucky (“Zogoiby”), the 
last Moorish king of Granada. Boabdil, as he exits the Alhambra, gives 
forth a sigh that marks the end of his kingdom and gives its name to 
Rushdie’s novel. As he hears the story, Abraham feels “all the mournful 
weight of Boabdil’s coming-to-an-end”:
Breath left his body with a whine, and the next breath was a gasp. The 
onset of asthma (more asthma! It’s a wonder I can breathe at all!) was like 
an omen, a joining of lives across the centuries, or so Abraham fancied as 
he grew into his manhood and the illness gained in strength. (MLS 80)
Abraham takes the onset of his asthma to be “an omen,” connect-
ing his life to Boabdil’s, across time. This is consolidated as Abraham 
grows, and his illness becomes more debilitating. Abraham can make this 
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connection because Boabdil’s sigh parallels his own experiences of asthma 
as a “whine” and a “gasp.” Somatic modes of awareness, according to 
Thomas J. Csordas, are the “culturally elaborated ways of attending to 
and with one’s body in surroundings that include the embodied presence 
of others.”10 Rushdie attends to the somatic effects of Abraham’s breath-
lessness, but he also shows how Abraham attends with his breathlessness. 
“Attending to a bodily sensation,” Csordas argues, “becomes a mode of 
attending to the intersubjective milieu that give rise to that sensation. 
Thus, one is paying attention with one’s body.”11
This is not a new way of thinking about literature and embodiment.12 
But it does permit us to think of breath in the novel as playing with mul-
tiple modalities of awareness. Abraham’s asthma attack serves to navigate 
the system at work. The attack begins with an exhalation (“a whine”), 
followed by an inhalation (“a gasp”). This is the immediate moment 
of postcolonial breathlessness, brought on as a result of a sympathetic 
response to the displaced Boabdil. Abraham’s is a physiological, not a 
cultural, connection across history: “[he] felt all the mournful weight of 
Boabdil’s coming-to-an-end, felt it as his own” (MLS 80). This connec-
tion is immediate and particular: it simply becomes impossible for him 
to breathe. The extended effect of this sympathy is more damaging than 
productive, for both Boabdil and the Da Gama-Zogoiby clan.
Breath conjoins Abraham and Boabdil in a manner that follows the 
operations of Homi Bhabha’s much-contested term, hybridity: “the 
interstitial passage between fixed identifications … to entertain difference 
without an assumed or imposed hierarchy.”13 Hybridity offers oppor-
tunities to subvert that which might otherwise be simply mimicked, in 
order to form new epistemic modes of connection. Breath, then, might 
be an enabling condition for hybridity, since it acts as a conduit between 
the asthma of Boabdil and Abraham. But, as Atef Laoyene has demon-
strated, Rushdie’s “post-exotic” style demolishes postcolonial hybridity:
Rushdie’s postmodern superimposition of Andalusian history and India’s 
national narrative in The Moor’s Last Sigh is less a nostalgia for an exotic 
and lost Golden Age, as many Rushdie critics have suggested, than an 
attempt to map out the limits of postcolonial hybridity as an empowering 
subject position.14
The limits, for Laoyene, are expressed in Rushdie’s attitude to 
Aurora’s artwork: “its variations on the Andalusian theme do not 
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foreground realistically enough the plight of India’s masses.”15 “The 
Andalusian theme” might refer as much to Boabdil’s influence on 
Abraham’s asthma as on Aurora’s art. Boabdil was forced to abdicate to 
Isabella of Spain, thus bringing an end to Moorish Spain and the con-
vivencia (or “living together”) between Christians, Jews and Muslims. 
The convivencia acts as a loose paradigm for subsequent celebrations of 
multiculturalism and hybridity. But, Laoyene argues, Rushdie’s inclusion 
of “the Moor” does not aim to endorse these celebrations. It critiques 
them. Abraham’s identification with Boabdil gives way to palimpsestic 
reproductions of Boabdil (by the artists, Vasco Miranda and Aurora), 
that eventually turns the Moor into a “phantasmagoric hollow man.”16 
In keeping with this hollowness, the elevation of Abraham’s moment of 
physiological crisis to the metaphysical matter of destiny leads to sub-
sequent deformations suffered by the family. His postcolonial breath-
lessness is a physiological response that he elevates to a transcultural, 
transhistorical network of shared suffering. Abraham will use this phys-
ical fragility as the basis of his criminal empire, as “a mughal of human 
frailty” (MLS 182). Although Abraham’s forays into the sex and drug 
trades have little to do with breath, the implication is that he recognises 
the ways of capitalising on human weakness through his own, physio-
logical vulnerability. The reality of physiological crises, confirmed and 
consolidated through the somaticising body, is that they put into play 
a series of attitudes and behaviours with long-term social consequences.
A conventional biographical reading of Rushdie authorises this 
sense that breathlessness, rather than its consequences, forms the 
“real” substrate of the novel. But it is also a fancy. Abraham’s whine-
gasp is taken to be like Boabdil’s last sigh. The solidarity of Abraham’s 
momentary breathlessness acts as the “deferential complaisant surface,” 
the “overneath,” to his actual life as a criminal mastermind, ruling “a 
Mogambo-ish underworld” (MLS 180). Rushdie implies something 
like Fanon’s connection between breathlessness and an absence of free-
dom when describing Abraham’s asthma. But, if we attend simply to 
the somatic immediacy of moments like these, we risk ignoring the ways 
in which these moments highlight other, systemic problems with the 
 postcolonial state.
The task then that faces us in discussing the image of breathlessness 
in postcolonial literature and thought is not, then, simply the immedi-
ate appearance of exacerbated breathlessness and its resolution. We must 
also consider how systems of breathlessness come to operate in more 
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covert, insidious ways. In contrasting immediate breathlessness with its 
more systemic conditions, our reading of Rushdie is, again, anticipated 
by Fanon. When considering the role Algerian women played in the 
Algerian War of Independence, Fanon makes a brief aside that links the 
phenomenological effects of occupation to respiratory distress: “there is 
not occupation, on the one hand, and independence of persons on the 
other. It is the country as a whole, its history, its daily pulsation that are 
contested, disfigured … under these conditions, the individual’s breath-
ing is an observed, an occupied breathing. It is a combat breathing.”17 
If, in early Fanon, a postcolonial breathlessness was a refusal brought 
about the immediate inability to breathe, by late Fanon, colonial occupa-
tion is far more subtle in its imposition of distorted breathing patterns.18 
When daily life itself suffers from a disfigured pulsation, no simple lib-
eration narrative can suffice. Fanon’s variated breathing, a poesis under 
political pressure, implies a complex problem: the need to reconfigure 
the conditions of breathing, as much as any more overt resistance.
We can illustrate Rushdie’s concern with a systemic distortion of 
breath by recalling, in our reading of the novel, Mahatma Gandhi’s 
Guide to Health (1921/1946), where breath becomes the basis for 
developing Gandhi’s ideological concerns with purity, pollution and con-
tamination.19 The Moor’s Last Sigh, like Midnight’s Children before it, is 
critical of Gandhi’s “sentimental claptrap of spinning your own cotton 
and travelling third-class on the train” (MLS 54). Rushdie’s response 
satirises the nativist elements of Gandhi’s programme, which sought a 
return to pre-colonial modes of production. Following Joseph Alter’s 
Gandhi’s Body, we can consider both the spinning and the travelling as 
elements in a broader project of biopolitical control: “Gandhi’s search 
for Truth was manifest in his biomoral politics and his experimenta-
tion … must be understood as integral to his project of satyagraha as 
a whole.”20 Similarly, Srirupa Prasad shows how Gandhi’s health proto-
cols, particularly those given in Guide to Health, are important in under-
standing not simply his nationalist politics but his sustained attempt to 
contain, curtail or restrict his affective affinities: “If swaraj or self-rule 
entailed manipulation and mastery over the body and its physiologi-
cal processes, such dominance was in essence command over the fluc-
tuations of emotions as well.”21 Control the body and you control the 
affective self. Rushdie’s satire seems well situated to follow this exten-
sion of Gandhi’s social activism into discourses of biopolitical control. 
After all, Rushdie’s characters are notoriously incapable of controlling 
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themselves, precisely because their bodies let them down: think, for 
instance, of Aurora’s rages, Flora’s madness or Moraes’s uncontrolled 
ageing (he ages twice as fast as the “norm”). Again, these afflictions 
come from their lack of control over their bodies, a lack of control that 
manifests as much in the formal profusions of Rushdie’s relentlessly 
associative prose as in the characters it represents. After remarking that 
it is easier to breathe in than out, Moraes goes on to liken this to pas-
sive resistance: “As it is easier to absorb what life offers than to give out 
the results of such absorption. As it is easier to take a blow than to hit 
back” (MLS 53). The latter has a family resemblance to a phrase, attrib-
uted to Gandhi, in Mahadev Desai’s 1931 account of the First Round 
Table Conference held to discuss India’s constitution in 1930. Speaking 
to a group of children from London’s East End, Gandhi “explains how 
it is better by far not to hit back than to return a blow for a blow.”22 
Satyagraha, or “the Force which is born of truth,” came to replace 
“passive resistance” in Gandhi’s philosophy, because the former implied 
strength and an adherence to truth where the latter might be confused 
with weakness and makes no mention of truth. But, when Moraes, the 
narrator, talks about passivity, it is not in conjunction with strength 
or truth; he advocates passivity because it is “easier.” In these terms, 
Rushdie reverses Gandhi’s protocols for the healthy body as the stepping 
stone to the healthy nation: often the unhealthy body is precisely what 
indicates the ill health of the state.
Rushdie had already challenged Gandhi’s correlation between the 
health of the body and of the state in Midnight’s Children, where the 
Indian State is “twinned” to Saleem Sinai more in sickness than in 
health. But it is Saleem’s constantly dripping nose that is particularly at 
odds with the protocols of Guide to Health: “nasal congestion obliged 
me to breathe through my mouth, giving me the air of a gasping gold-
fish; perennial blockages doomed me to a childhood without per-
fumes.”23 For Gandhi, “that man alone is perfectly healthy … whose 
nose is free from dirty matter.”24 This is not his sole marker of health, 
but it is sufficiently important that Gandhi will return to it numerous 
times over the course of the pamphlet, stressing both the need to keep 
the nose clean and “to breathe through the nose.”25 “The air which is 
inhaled through the nostrils is sifted before it reaches the lungs, and is 
also warmed in the process.”26 In fact, breathing through the nose is 
so important that people who find themselves breathing through the 
mouth should “sleep with a bandage around the mouth.”27 If it warms 
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the breath, breathing through the nose also acts as a filter, “a sieve,” for 
impurities in the air. In this, breath control fits into the wider biopolitical 
concern with purification and pollution in the Guide.28
Mary Douglas, in her seminal Purity and Danger, begins her anal-
ysis of pollution by defining dirt as “matter out of place.”29 Pollution, 
according to Douglas, is determined not by a substance’s quiddity, 
but by its position. Pollution pollutes when it transgresses into forbid-
den places; it violates laws formulated for moral reasons, rather than 
for principles of hygiene. Douglas’s thinking demonstrates just how 
morally based Gandhi’s hygiene practices are.30 Protecting the body 
from dirt requires a clear moral stance on what constitutes dirt. And 
while Gandhi’s examples are scarcely questionable (he cites London’s 
smog, for instance), they do draw on “biomoral” politics. The instance 
of London smog appears fairly innocuous, but the specific place, 
“London,” has a significant political charge, given Gandhi’s work to 
secure Indian Independence from Britain. A Guide to Health, first writ-
ten in Gujarat for Indian Opinion in 1913, ostensibly gains a political 
element when it is historicised, that is, put into relation with time. Will 
Viney introduces his study of waste by expanding Douglas’s remit to 
include time: “this insistence on spaces of waste can confuse and obscure 
the crucial influence that time has in our experience of and dealing with 
waste things. Waste is also (and in both senses of the phrase) matter out 
of time.”31 If both Douglas and Viney are ultimately more concerned 
with waste things, their arguments impact on how we assess Gandhi’s 
ideological preoccupation with purity. For, while we should acknowl-
edge the empirical importance of the hygienic practices he is proposing, 
these practices do rely on an epistemic practice where each thing is kept 
to its proper place and time. The nose has just such a responsibility for 
Gandhi: it protects the body from outside pollutants. For Rushdie, the 
nose abdicates this responsibility, since it has an affective relation with 
these supposed contaminants that registers both in space and in time.
In The Moor’s Last Sigh, the nose is marked as a site of affective con-
tamination. These contaminations may register in linguistic, economic, 
erotic and physiological ways, but they have corresponding affective 
consequences. Camoens, Moraes’s grandfather, pronounces his name 
“Camonsh-through-the-nose” (MLS 9), marking the family’s commitment 
to their Portuguese (“alien”) roots. When Moraes’s parents, Abraham and 
Aurora, first make love, they do so on some pepper sacks, imbuing their 
skin and sweat with the smell of pepper: “what had been breathed in from 
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the air during that transcendent fuck” (MLS 90). Contaminants through 
the nose destabilise the moral callings of other characters: notably Flora, 
Abraham’s mother, and Oliver D’Aeth, the comic, photophobic Anglican 
priest, are driven mad by the smell of pepper on the lovers. Ultimately, 
when Aoi Ue tells the story of defeated love, it is not the substantive mat-
ter of betrayal that she cites as the reason she leaves her husband, it is those 
“small habits” that makes her leave: “the relish with which he picked his 
nose” (MLS 425). Finally, the physiological effect of a blocked nose cor-
relates to an open mouth. When Uma, Moraes’s lover, kills herself, the 
Police Inspector forces Moraes to take the remaining suicide pill by grab-
bing his nose: “Airlessness demanded my full attention …. I yielded to the 
inevitable” (MLS 292). Here, Moraes yields to the inevitable urge to open 
his mouth and breathe. A similar correlation between closed nose and 
open mouth occurs at the property of Hindu Nationalist, Raman Fielding, 
where the guard, Sneezo, is “permanently bung-nosed and – perhaps in 
compensation – less tight-lipped” (MLS 366). Nasal blockages effect a 
loss of control over the mouth, both physiologically and psychologically. 
In each situation, the nose is not, or has ceased to be, an adequate sieve. 
It either fails to keep the body pure from contaminants in the air or man-
ages to do so only by blocking itself from outside influences. In our discus-
sion of somatic modes of attention, it became clear that, instead of turning 
bodily sensation into the symptom of some other condition, Csordas sug-
gests a mode of attention that uses the body to pay attention to the world. 
By paying attention to phenomena like Camoens’s name, Abraham and 
Aurora’s shared odour, or Sneezo’s bunged up nose, we are not simply 
reading symptoms of the deformations of colonialism; we are reading its 
effects as they are imprinted on vulnerable bodies.
Rushdie’s concern with the nose reminds us that images of 
 postcolonial breathlessness require us to attend equally to descriptions 
of immediate breathlessness and to the respiratory systems which under-
pin them. In order to exercise a postcolonial literary analysis of this 
work that is at least as attentive to form as it is to sociopolitical condi-
tions, it is necessary subject Fanon’s phrase, “combat breathing,” to a 
more critical appraisal. Considered as a contested, disfigured daily pul-
sation, “combat breathing” might be recast as a form of chronic stress, 
whereby the protracted exposure to “a real or perceived threat to home-
ostasis or well-being … can cause pronounced changes in psychology 
and behaviour that have long-term deleterious implications for survival 
and well-being.”32 “Medicalising” the term risks evacuating from it the 
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specific form it takes in Fanon’s essay. In context, it appears in a passage 
which relates to Fanon’s broader psycho-phenomenological project: “it 
is not the soil that is occupied …. French colonialism has settled itself in 
the very centre of the Algerian individual and has undertaken a sustained 
work of cleanup, of expulsion of self, of rationally pursued mutilation.”33 
Fanon’s epiphora suggests that the breathing of the occupied becomes a 
mangle that includes the immediate experience of the colonised subject, 
the long-term conditions of the colonial environment and the contesta-
tion of their “daily pulsation.” Fanon’s combat breathing is not, then, a 
protocol of military training or a medical diagnosis; it is the marker of a 
colonial distortion that includes subjects, environments and activities.
In this exposition, “combat breathing” might simply describe par-
allels between the breathing complaints of Moraes and his family, and 
their extended experience of those colonial, and postcolonial, distor-
tions that constitute threats to their homeostasis. Albert Memmi argues 
in The Colonizer and the Colonized that “colonized society is a diseased 
society in which internal dynamics no longer succeed in creating new 
structures.”34 Without a dynamic social system, the colonised society 
is unable to adapt to intergenerational conflict. It hardens into “a mask 
under which it slowly smothers and dies.”35 The distorted breathing pat-
terns of the family, in this analytic, are symptom of “a dying colonial-
ism”: a succession of smothering situations that may be diagnosed as the 
problems of the colonised society. But taking such a schematic approach 
to combat breathing fails to address the dynamic role that breathing 
plays in the novel, since it is not simply the passive indicator of under-
lying distortions; the presentation of distorted breathing is, like other 
forms of mimicry, “at once resemblance and menace.”36 But no adequate 
reading of the novel could take it to be a passive narrative of colonial 
subjugation, given how complicit the Zogoiby family and their anteced-
ents, the Da Gamas, are with the colonial and postcolonial economic 
structures that bring about this systemic breathlessness.
As the novel opens, the family business, the pepper trade, is given as 
a root cause of colonialism, “what brought Vasco da Gama’s tall ships 
across the ocean,” “for if it had not been for peppercorns, then what 
is ending now in East and West might never have begun” (MLS 4). 
As Matthew Henry convincingly demonstrates, the economic suc-
cesses and setbacks of the family are often set against the backdrop 
of major political periods, like the Indian Independence Movement, 
Indira Gandhi’s Emergency Rule and the rise of Hindu nationalism 
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(parodied in the novel as “Mumbai’s Axis”).37 Indeed, the fortunes of 
the family rise and fall by the vicissitudes of the spice market, and, later, 
the building industry and the sex trade. Art, both that represented in 
the novel and the novel itself, is rendered complicit with this long his-
tory of exploitation. Rushdie contrasts the foregrounding of an “Epico- 
Mythico-Tragico-Comico-Super-Sexy-High-Masala-Art” to the existence 
of the poor and undocumented “invisible” workers in Bombay. These 
workers are responsible for a city invisible to public scrutiny (i.e. not seen 
by building code inspectors). Together, workers and city form the  hidden 
side of a palimpsest: “Under World beneath Over world, black market 
beneath white; … the whole of life was like this … an invisible reality 
moved phantomwise beneath a visible fiction, subverting all its mean-
ings” (MLS 184). A more complex analytic of the novel would address 
this complicity as an example of that “rationally pursued mutilation” that 
occurs when colonialism “settles” in the centre of the individual.
Again, there are correspondences between this reading and the  novel’s 
treatment of breath. Breathing in the family’s spice precipitates  allergic 
responses in Great-Grandmother Epifania, who is happier spending 
money than developing the business that earns it, in a satiric separation 
of capital from the concrete conditions of its production. Epifania’s aller-
gies set up a dialectic between the abstract conditions of colonial capital 
and its concrete, “breathed” experience. But they also imply a formation, 
as postcolonial breathlessness turns into combat breathing. Inherent in 
Epifania’s distress are two distinct time periods: the moment of crisis 
(the allergic attack) and the formation of a response (her anticipation of 
further attacks). Thus, Epifania’s allergic reaction to spice leads her to 
the decision to invest in perfume. Epifania’s sneezing is the result of her 
breathing the family’s spices in through her nose: “good perfume take 
the place of these stuffs [the spice] that maddofy my nose” (MLS 35). 
The first financial disaster for the Da Gama family foments as a result of 
her desire to replace the spice business with perfume. This is only the 
first time that breath (and allergies) will develop a politics that in turn 
dictates the economic decisions of the Da Gamas and the Zogoibys, in 
the formation of “combat breathing.”
Insofar as it gathers together subjects, environments and  activities, 
the novel uses breath as a conceit that extends beyond the body. Breath, 
in this sense, stands for other issues raised by the novel, rather than 
for, or only for, itself. Combat breathing “substitutes” for a general-
ised response to colonial rule. But it also describes the specific, physical 
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manifestation of colonial distortions. Breath, always already a transient, 
ephemeral experience, collapses together a complex array of social, polit-
ical and cultural conditions with a highly specific physiological response 
to these conditions. The consequence of conflation, for the wider pro-
ject on breath and literature, is that combat breathing becomes a point 
of tense metaphoric connection between the internal, somatic conditions 
of postcolonial subjects and the external, fraught environments they 
inhabit.
The consequence might simply be that somatic modes of aware-
ness inevitably give rise to a problematic politics of culture. Laoyene, in a 
sense, anticipates the cultural aspect of my argument, since he shows how 
Rushdie criticises the political naiveté that might use a complex political 
occurrence like the convivencia to allegorise an anodyne paradigm of mul-
ticulturalism. Laoyene’s conclusions about multicultural bodies, based, like 
mine, on the Abraham-Boabdil hybrid, do not ultimately draw on somatic 
effects; in fact, the real of the body barely features in Laoyene’s essay.38 
Even the sophisticated intertextual accounts that make passing reference 
to the breathless body, like Alberto Fernandez Carbajal’s Compromise and 
Resistance, fall short of examining the body as anything more than a symp-
tom of something else.39 Breath does not need to be “diagnosed” as a 
subjective phenomenological formulation of a more objective reality, be it 
political (Laoyene), economic (Henry) or literary (Carbajal). If anything, it 
is breathlessness that forms a more objective reality for the novel, since the 
hallucinatory variations of the political, the economic and the artistic will 
depend, at some point, on the deformations of people’s breathing. In order 
to understand the politics inherent in Rushdie’s literary mode of breath 
awareness, as a system of signs including both the sustained deformations 
of “combat breathing” and the more immediate “political breathlessness,” 
we can return once again to Abraham’s asthma attack. The asthma attack 
does link lives, though this link is only superficially to be found between 
Abraham and Boabdil. In fact, it quilts Abraham together with individuals 
from across the whole Da Gama/Zogoiby clans, whose various breathing 
ailments commit the novel to a chain of respiratory signification. Asthma, 
argues François-Bernard Michel in La souffle coupé, is characterised by 
moments of “crisis,” in which the otherwise healthy subject becomes tem-
porarily ill.40 Asthma throws the “normal” dichotomy between the nor-
mal and the pathological into disarray, since, for the asthmatic not in crisis, 
illness is absent as bodily experience, while remaining present as a source of 
anxiety or concern. It is, in other words, latent.41
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Asthmatic latency links together what might be regarded as the 
 novel’s symptoms: the sighs and allergies that I have already discussed 
in relation to political and the economic concerns have an underlying 
somatic order, when read alongside the familial asthma. But, to read 
asthmatic latency as simply symptomatic of more material conditions 
ignores the discursive regimes in which breath acts as a sign: the way in 
which the sighs and allergies index existential anxieties in response to 
political troubles “in the air.” And yet, these are still terms that mediate 
our experience of reading a novel, rather than either the immediate phys-
iological experience of breathlessness or the more systemic conditions of 
“combat breathing.”
References to breath in the novel are, after all, signs, rather than 
actual embodied conditions. More specifically, breath terms can be taken 
as signs that directly refer to felt concerns about invisibility and transi-
ence in the postcolony, for which politics, economics and intertextuality 
are reified abstractions. In order to develop this interventionist read-
ing of breath, I want to turn towards breath’s linguistic features in The 
Moor’s Last Sigh, namely catachresis and markedness. Then, I show how 
these features contribute to an implicit critique of a purely biopolitical 
understanding of combat breathing.
These features are evident in a particularly contained way in a page 
and a half meditation, where Moraes Zogoiby enumerates a plethora of 
breath significances. The meditation, which begins “in my family we’ve 
always found the world’s air hard to breathe,” interrupts the narrative at 
a climactic moment: the narrator’s maternal grandmother, Isabella, has 
just died of a combination of tuberculosis and lung cancer (MLS 53). 
By transferring the focus from Isabella’s cough to “the world’s air,” 
Moraes displaces the family’s “breathing problems” to a broader social 
epistemic atmosphere (MLS 53). The failure of the body interfaces 
with the failure of the air, already understood to be “Life’s Last Gasp 
Saloon,” or “the Ultimo Suspiro gas station” (MLS 4). Yet, immediately, 
“a sigh isn’t just a sigh. We inhale the world and breathe out meaning” 
(MLS 54). On a physiological level, this might refer to the sense of ease 
the asthmatic feels when she is finally able to exhale. Yet it also implies 
that a chaotic jumble of sense-data (“the world”) is, through the process 
of breathing, ordered and made meaningful. The relationship between 
individual and world is not a matter of thought, but of breath, transfor-
mation and meaning-making. For Rushdie’s asthmatic, breath twins the 
vulnerability and resilience of the postcolonial subject.
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The respiratory permutations of this meditation pull at a  number 
of different traditions: physiological, literary, philosophical and 
 etymological (MLS 53–54). Moraes will draw on all these traditions to 
consider what it means to become one’s breath in a moment of asth-
matic crisis. So, he notes, “such force of self as I retain focuses upon the 
faulty operations of my chest: the coughing, the fishy gulps” (MLS 53). 
“It is not thinking makes us so,” he gently chides Shakespeare’s Hamlet, 
“but air.” “Suspiro ergo sum. I sigh therefore I am,” he utters in playful 
homage to Descartes. “The Latin as usual tells the truth: suspirare = sub, 
below, +spirare, verb, to breathe. Suspiro: I under-breathe” (MLS 53). 
The Latin, of course, does not tell the truth, nor does it follow that 
Rushdie’s playful reworking of Shakespeare or Descartes is much more 
than a baroque elaboration. But the meditation does highlight for-
mal features and functions of breath explored in the novel, which cut 
across philosophical, literary, physiological and etymological disciplines. 
Collectively, these formal features, when read across their disciplinary 
divisions, anticipate the observation that breath is divided, across disci-
plines, into aesthetic and biopolitical functions
Breath replaces thinking as the first principle of Moraes’s sceptical phi-
losophy. If Descartes began from the principle that, in order to doubt, 
he must think, and therefore be, Moraes begins from the more playful 
assumption that, since air is what makes us so, his sighing is proof that 
he exists. This may be a reference to embodiment; more likely, however, 
we read it as an allusion to the novel’s title. This is, after all, Moraes’s 
(the Moor’s) last sigh. The metatextual reference is to Moraes’s self- 
identification as a textual construct, whose “being” is entirely bound 
up in narrating the text (sighing). But breath is a particularly unrelia-
ble first principle, since its referent slips easily between bodily function 
and aerious substance. In Moraes’s meditation, the slippage develops 
between four distinct, discursive practices: physiology, literature, philos-
ophy and etymology. The result is catachresis, or, what Jacques Derrida 
has called “the violent and forced abusive inscription of a sign, the impo-
sition of a sign upon a meaning which did not yet have its own proper 
sign in language.”42 Breath, the violent sign, imposes itself on breathing 
in its heterodox meanings as physical process, poetic expression, philo-
sophical principle and etymological elucidation. Breath is catachrestic 
because it imposes a generic sign onto a heterodox series of protocols 
connected by little more than a metaphoric connection to human respi-
ration. This has political ramifications, particularly for postcolonialism, as 
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Gayatri Spivak observes when she invokes catachresis as a political means 
for “reversing, displacing, and seizing the apparatus of value-coding.”43  
In this light, Moraes’s suggestion that “we inhale the world and breathe 
out meaning” becomes altogether more sinister. The meaning that 
Moraes breathes out in his Sigh imposes on his references to Descartes 
and Shakespeare the collective sense of a postcolonial subjectivity that, 
perhaps, yields darker implications when associated with the structural 
manipulations of Abraham’s criminal empire.
The different registers of breath “breathe out” not altogether compat-
ible meanings. These incompatibilities are emphasised because Rushdie 
compresses them into a single paragraph. The Moor’s Last Sigh marks 
breath as much in its differences as its repetition. Therefore, if breath is 
catachrestic, eliding or violating different conceptual registers, it is also 
“marked.” The net effect of both the differences, or inconsistencies, and 
the repetitions, or continuities, is to emphasise breath or mark it. In the 
introduction to this volume, we discussed “marking,” those phonologi-
cal, grammatical or semantic features that distinguish the particular iter-
ation of a word from its dominant, “default” meaning. By asserting its 
deviation from the norm, marking grants the marked term a conceptual 
significance. Deviation may be measured through consistencies or incon-
sistencies, but it must emerge in context.
Contextual deviation has wider implications for studies of the novel 
genre. My underlying generic assumption is that breath, in novels, inten-
sifies what Frederic Jameson has called “the antinomies of realism.”44 
Since novels have no need to mention that characters breathe, any men-
tion of breath necessarily contributes either to the novel’s “destiny” (the 
narrative message) or its “affect” (the concerns of its narration).45 Breath 
contributes to the narrative or the description, but it functions as nei-
ther a narrative device nor a descriptive detour. This link between world 
and subjective experience has important consequences for thinking post-
colonial subject–space relations, which I will turn to in due course. Not 
being necessary or optimal for concision or meaning, a “superfluous” 
mention of breath must therefore designate an emphasis. This assertion 
relies on a structuralist understanding of breath: it may be taken as an 
arbitrary sign, whose referent is marked by virtue of unusual semantic or 
syntactic activity. But it is worth recalling a further aspect of our earlier 
discussion of markedness. Markedness originates as a biological reference 
to normal breathing patterns in Trubetzkoy’s Principles of Phonology: 
“In any correlation based on the manner of overcoming an obstruction 
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a ‘natural’ absence of marking is attributable to that opposition member 
whose production requires the least deviation from normal breathing. 
The opposing member is then of course the marked member.”46
Trubetzkoy’s use of “normal breathing” as an index should provoke 
readers of The Moor’s Last Sigh, not least because all breathing is some-
what abnormal in the novel. This extends from the unhealthy narrator, 
Moraes, who focuses “upon the faulty operations of my chest” to the 
bodyguard, Sammy Hazaré, whose lack of “breathing problems” itself 
implies an abnormal lung capacity: he wins “impromptu lung-power 
contests (holding of breath, blowing of a tiny dart through a long metal 
blowpipe, extinguishing of candles)” (MLS 53; 312). If the “normal” is 
unmarked, it tacitly promotes a standard rhythm and volume for breath, 
against which any variation may be measured. Moraes’s standard, how-
ever, is recognisably “faulty”; it deviates, but from what? Clearly, norms 
are being challenged here, but first we should consider briefly which 
norms these might be. Breath has two significant “normalities” that 
work in quite different, even contradictory, ways: aesthetic symmetry and 
physiological function.
Aesthetically, breath is often understood to be a symmetrical cycle of 
inhalation and exhalation. For example, Samuel Beckett’s Breath, the 
35-second performance piece that fades in and out over a stage covered 
in rubbish, turns the inhalation and exhalation of a single breath into a 
symmetrical procedure.47 Beckett allots inhalation and exhalation equal 
time and sound intensity, despite there being little physiological basis 
for this correspondence. Breath’s stage directions suggest the symmet-
rical inhalation and exhalation should each be associated with a cry, or 
“vagitus.” These first and last cries are present, equally symmetrically, 
in The Moor’s Last Sigh. Moraes will say of himself: “I am what began 
long ago with an exhaled cry, what will conclude when a glass held to my 
lips remains clear” (MLS 53). Later, we find that Moraes actually gives 
forth a “vagitus uterinus,” or first cry in utero: “I … unleashed a mighty 
groan” as Aurora hears “my first sound emerging from inside her body” 
(MLS 145). Yet again, he truncates his life cycle to phono-aesthetic 
symmetry: “From Moo to Moor, from first groan to last sigh: on such 
hooks hang my tales” (MLS 145). While Breath alienates the aesthetics 
of respiration from its physiological basis by making it wholly symmetri-
cal, Rushdie attempts something more complicated. After all, Rushdie’s 
breath, as the aesthetic focus of an art object, is not wholly symmetri-
cal: “it is easier to breathe in than out,” Moraes tells us (MLS 53). 
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In The Moor’s Last Sigh, aesthetic symmetries and physiological  exigencies 
of breath coalesce into a normative practice. In many ways, their  tension 
maps imperfectly on to the tension that Aurora Zogoiby, Moraes’s 
mother, experiences in her artwork, post-Independence: “the tension 
between Vasco Miranda’s playful influence, his fondness for imaginary 
worlds whose only natural law was his own sovereign whimsicality, and 
Abraham’s dogmatic insistence on the importance … of a clear-sighted 
naturalism that would help India describe herself to herself” (MLS 173). 
Rushdie’s implicit challenge here is to ways in which aesthetic play and 
physiological naturalism both ultimately prioritise problematic normative 
practices.
In order to unpick the normativity implied in breath, it is worth 
thinking about how a supposedly apolitical physiology may be just as ide-
ologically marked as any form of aesthetic symmetry. Here, we have a 
precedent in Lundy Braun’s excellent Breathing Race into the Machine: 
The Surprising Career of the Spirometer from Plantation to Genetics.48 
Braun addresses the problematic ways in which spirometry was used 
to naturalise racial distinctions in medical practice. At least some of the 
standard measures used in spirometry, Braun argues, occlude a deeply 
troubling racial history, where the normalised practice of “correcting” 
for ethnic grouping forgets its origins in slave plantations and indentured 
service. Breath science has a biopolitical edge with consequences for the 
whole notion of normal breathing as physiological function. If “normal 
breathing” is a contested site, the biological basis of Trubetzkoy’s mark-
edness is necessarily suspected. Although work in linguistics has recog-
nised these problems and moved on from Trubetzkoy (not least through 
Joseph Greenberg’s work on frequency), biologically based markedness 
still has conceptual value in thinking about breath. It just requires a 
two-stage approach. First, the deviation (“the marked term”) is noted, 
and then, second, the norm (“the unmarked term”) is assessed for the 
ideo logical baggage it carries. In thinking about this play between mark-
edness and unmarkedness, alongside the immediacy of postcolonial 
breathlessness and the more protracted problems of combat breathing, 
Braun’s biopolitical concerns clarify why breath is a sign, rather than a 
symptom, of political, economic and, in the novel, literary control. If 
breath was a symptom, it would simply point to the underlying, “real” 
conditions of the novel, whether political or economic or cultural. But, 
in a real sense, these conditions are formed in response to and in concert 
with somatic effects that morph and change over time.
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Earlier, we found Rushdie’s nasal anomalies to be the more marked 
when set against Gandhi’s hygiene norms. This might be the basis for a 
further, symptomatic reading, in which a comparative reading of Gandhi 
and Rushdie might diagnose in the ills of the nose a symptom of the 
nation’s ills. But it seems more pertinent to return to my discussion of 
Gandhi, via the subsequent observations in this chapter: that the acute cri-
sis of postcolonial breathlessness can deform itself into an extended period 
of “combat breathing”; that exercising a symptomology of breath may 
well hasten, rather than hinder, this process of deformation; that the cat-
achretic qualities of breath, as a term with multiple, conflicting meanings, 
may contribute to this deformation; and that Rushdie highlights some of 
these effects by “marking” breath’s normativity. The consequence, then, 
of reading The Moor’s Last Sigh alongside A Guide to Health is nothing 
less than a deconstruction of a breath-related postcolonial politics. If the 
anticolonial gesture is to disrupt the pervasive effects of combat breathing, 
by instantiating new, “healthier” regulations for physiologies, the obvious 
point of concern for the postcolonial critic is the striking resemblance new 
regulations bear to colonial-era policies.49 Breath patterns may have imme-
diate deformities, whether in the asthmatic crisis or the nasal blockage. 
But when these deformities are systematised, as regulatory conditions 
whose distortions are interpolated by breathing subjects, mere resolution 
of the individual crisis or blockage will no longer suffice. Indeed, “resolv-
ing” the problem, in its acute phase, may well occlude precisely those 
systemic problems that Rushdie’s breath metaphors help disclose. If the 
need for actual medical attention in actual moments of respiratory distress 
appears to offer compelling reasons to dismiss this “systemic critique” as a 
luxury of the fit and the well, we must remember that combat breathing 
offers not just the rallying cry it became, but a warning against such lan-
guage, which, all too easily, collapses distinctions between actual, suffering 
bodies and their mobilisation for political purposes. What Rushdie ulti-
mately offers us is not a resolution for the problem of combat breathing. 
Rather, he reminds us that subjects who breathe will always be mediated 
through a language more attentive to breath’s poetic significances than the 
mundanity that attends each individual, unmarked breath.
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